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CLARE HUNTINGTON*
ABSTRACT
Family law scholarship is thriving, with scholars using varied methodologies
to analyze intimate partner violence, cohabitation, child maltreatment, juvenile
misconduct, and child custody, to name but a few areas of study. Despite the
richness of this discourse, however, most family law scholars ignore a key tool
deployed in virtually every other legal-academic domain: institutional analysis.
This methodology, which plays a foundational role in legal scholarship,
focuses on four basic questions. Scholars often begin empirically, identifying the
specific legal, social, and economic institutions that shape an area of legal
regulation. Beyond descriptive accounts, scholars analyze how authority is and
should be allocated across institutions—what is called institutional choice.
Scholars similarly consider questions of institutional design, exploring how a
specific institution operates and asking whether the institution could be more
efficient and effective. Finally, scholars evaluate institutional frictions,
anticipating the institutions that are likely to advance or impede law reform.
For nearly every contemporary issue in family law, a descriptive account of
relevant institutions and an analysis of institutional choice, institutional design,
and institutional friction would add critical—and missing—elements to current
debates. To demonstrate the value of this methodology, this Article frames the
relevance of these four dimensions of institutionalism and begins the process of
applying that frame to specific controversies at the heart of contemporary family
law. The resulting insights across a range of doctrinal, theoretical, and policy
debates are deeply relevant to scholars, lawmakers, and policymakers. In short,
it is long overdue for family law scholars to join the ranks of institutionalists,
and this Article charts the path for doing so.
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INTRODUCTION
Family law scholarship is flourishing, with in-depth analyses of the economic
rights of cohabitants,1 the impact of child support policies on family poverty,2
the rights of unmarried fathers,3 responses to family violence,4 state policies to
help families negotiate caregiving and paid labor,5 child custody rules,6
competing rationales for awards of spousal support,7 and much more. In this

1
See, e.g., Albertina Antognini, Nonmarital Coverture, 99 B.U. L. REV. 2139, 2159-90
(2019) (arguing that principles rooted in coverture govern distribution of property between
separating unmarried couples); Emily J. Stolzenberg, The New Family Freedom, 59 B.C. L.
REV. 1983, 2018-31 (2018) (describing debates about economic rights of cohabitants).
2
See, e.g., Tonya L. Brito, The Child Support Debt Bubble, 9 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 953,
955-56 (2019) (contending child support policies do not alleviate child poverty because lowincome noncustodial parents do not have income to pay awards); Laurie S. Kohn, Engaging
Men as Fathers: The Courts, the Law, and Father-Absence in Low-Income Families, 35
CARDOZO L. REV. 511, 531-33 (2013) (making similar argument).
3
Compare Leslie Joan Harris, Family Policy After the Fragile Families and Relationship
Dynamics Studies, 35 LAW & INEQ. 223, 231-35 (2017) (arguing family law should not treat
unmarried fathers the same as married fathers given differences in commitment in nonmarital
relationships and greater incidence of violence), with Clare Huntington, Postmarital Family
Law: A Legal Structure for Nonmarital Families, 67 STAN. L. REV. 167, 225-31 (2015)
[hereinafter Huntington, Postmarital Family Law] (arguing for stronger family law protection
of unmarried fathers).
4
See, e.g., LEIGH GOODMARK, A TROUBLED MARRIAGE: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE
LEGAL SYSTEM 3-6 (2012) (identifying many problematic ways family law responds to
intimate partner violence); Joan S. Meier, U.S. Child Custody Outcomes in Cases Involving
Parental Alienation and Abuse Allegations: What Do the Data Show?, 42 J. SOC. WELFARE
& FAM. L. 92, 95-102 (2020) (reporting results of empirical study on custody cases and claims
of child abuse by each parent); Elizabeth M. Schneider & Cheryl Hanna, The Development of
Domestic Violence as a Legal Field: Honoring Clare Dalton, 20 J.L. & POL’Y 343, 350-58
(2012) (reviewing legal literature on intimate partner violence).
5
See, e.g., MAXINE EICHNER, THE FREE-MARKET FAMILY: HOW THE MARKET CRUSHED
THE AMERICAN DREAM (AND HOW IT CAN BE RESTORED) 195-212 (2020) (listing such
policies).
6
See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Prioritizing Past Caretaking in Child-Custody
Decisionmaking, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 29, 30-32 (2014) (describing lack of uptake for
past-caretaking rule); Robert Mnookin, Child Custody Revisited, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
249, 250-53 (2014) (revisiting Mnookin’s canonical argument that the best-interests standard
is inevitably and problematically indeterminate).
7
For a foundational account positing a noncontractual theory for spousal support, see Ira
Mark Ellman, The Theory of Alimony, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 40-81 (1989). For a description of
current debates, see Marshal S. Willick, A Universal Approach to Alimony: How Alimony
Should Be Calculated and Why, 27 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAWS. 153, 172-201 (2015).
This Article defines family law to include three principal domains: substantive rules that
regulate family behavior, dispute-resolution systems, and the distribution of material
resources and services to families. See infra text accompanying note 124. Some scholars,
including myself in some contexts, define family law much more broadly to include virtually
every area of the law that affects family functioning, from tax law to criminal law. See infra
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work, scholars fruitfully deploy varied methodologies, including doctrinal
analysis, empiricism, ethnography, critical race theory, feminist legal theory,
and law and economics.8 Most family law scholars, however, ignore a
methodological tool deployed by scholars in virtually every other field in the
legal academy: institutional analysis.
The study of institutions has a rich history. For more than a century, scholars
in sociology, economics, political science, and other disciplines have studied the
creation, evolution, and influence of institutions.9 Legal scholars have long been
part of this discourse, drawing on institutionalism to make significant
contributions to the understanding of the law.10 Indeed, institutionalism is so
widespread in legal scholarship that one commentator calls it a unifying
methodology.11 Except in family law.
Institutional analysis can be synthesized into four basic questions,12 each with
its own rigorous methodology and large body of multidisciplinary literature.13
Scholars often start by mapping the institutional landscape, asking which

text accompanying note 121. The absence of institutional analysis is largely confined to the
narrower definition of family law. See infra Section I.B (discussing rare examples of
institutionalism in family law).
8
See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY
AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 14-54 (1995) (discussing feminist legal theory);
Antognini, supra note 1, at 2159-90 (applying doctrinal analysis); Margaret F. Brinig,
Empirical Work in Family Law, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1083, 1085 (reviewing law and
economics scholarship in family law); Clare Huntington, The Empirical Turn in Family Law,
118 COLUM. L. REV. 227, 235-66 (2018) [hereinafter Huntington, Empirical Turn] (describing
empiricism in family law); R.A. Lenhardt, The Color of Kinship, 102 IOWA L. REV. 2071,
2101-06 (2017) (advocating for application of critical race theory in family law); Tonya L.
Brito, Daanika Gordon & David J. Pate, Jr., Focused Ethnography: A Methodological
Approach for Engaged Legal Scholarship, in LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP FOR THE URBAN CORE:
FROM THE GROUND UP 141, 141-74 (Peter Enrich & Rashmi Dyal-Chand eds., 2019)
(proposing use of ethnography in legal scholarship).
9
See infra text accompanying notes 44-46 (defining features of institutionalism across
various scholarship fields).
10
See infra text accompanying notes 47-67 (describing this scholarship in multiple fields,
from statutory interpretation and property, to law and economics and election law). For a
foundational account documenting the institutional turn in legal scholarship and its foundation
in new institutional economics and continental social thought, see Edward L. Rubin, The New
Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and the Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARV.
L. REV. 1393, 1411-33 (1996). For a summary updating the legal scholarship in multiple
fields, see Victoria Nourse & Gregory Shaffer, Varieties of New Legal Realism: Can a New
World Order Prompt a New Legal Theory?, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 85-90 (2009).
11
See Rubin, supra note 10, at 1424-25 (noting institutionalist methodology unites
seemingly divergent areas of legal thought and arguing this institutional turn reflects new
synthesis in legal thought, with scholars coalescing around microanalysis of institutions).
12
See infra Section I.A.2.
13
See infra text accompanying notes 81-95.
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institutions influence an area of legal regulation.14 Beyond descriptive accounts,
scholars analyze institutional choice, asking how authority is and should be
allocated across institutions.15 Scholars likewise consider questions of
institutional design, exploring how specific institutions operate and,
prescriptively, whether institutions could be more efficient and effective.16
Finally, scholars often evaluate institutional friction, anticipating which
institutions are likely to advance or impede reforms to law and policy.17
There is no singular definition of an “institution,” and scholars most broadly
define the concept as the “humanly devised constraints that structure human
interaction.”18 Institutions thus include legal, economic, and social institutions,
14
See infra text accompanying note 81 (describing mapping of institutional landscape in
context of First Amendment rights). This mapping exercise is, standing alone, a significant
contribution to the literature. It reveals, for example, which institutions are especially
influential, and it can surface the hidden force of underappreciated institutions. See, e.g., infra
Section III.A (discussing central role of nonstate institutions in family law). In any given
analysis, the breadth of relevant institutions will accordion in or out.
15
See infra text accompanying notes 84-88 (describing analysis of institutional choice);
Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power Within Agencies, 120 YALE L.J.
1032, 1076-77 (2011) (“Institutional choice involves the allocation of power across
institutions, taking those institutions as fixed. By contrast, institutional design takes the
allocation of tasks as fixed and asks how institutions should be designed so as best to execute
the tasks entrusted to them.”).
16
See infra text accompanying notes 89-92 (describing analysis of institutional design);
Mitchell Pearsall Reich, Incomplete Designs, 94 TEX. L. REV. 807, 812-13 (2016) (describing
legal scholarship on institutional design).
17
See infra text accompanying notes 94-95 (describing analysis of institutional friction—
institutions that can be harnessed in support of reform and those institutions that will resist
it).
18
Douglass C. North, Economic Performance Through Time, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 359, 360
(1994) (providing definition and noting inclusion of “formal constraints (e.g., rules, laws,
constitutions), informal constraints (e.g., norms of behavior, conventions, self-imposed codes
of conduct), and their enforcement characteristics”); see also infra text accompanying notes
70-75 (describing broad definition that institutions structure human interaction and further
noting that an institution has normative component, telling person how they should act;
regulative component, providing rules to guide action; and cognitive component, relieving
person of conscious thought because compliance is routine). There are other meanings of an
institution, of course, including the popular use of the term to refer to a psychiatric hospital—
as in the pejorative statement “she should be institutionalized.” See, e.g., Kate Moore,
Declared Insane for Speaking Up: The Dark American History of Silencing Women Through
Psychiatry, TIME (June 22, 2021, 5:35 PM), https://time.com/6074783/psychiatry-historywomen-mental-health/ (explaining nineteenth-century practice of institutionalizing women
“for defying ‘all domestic control’”). This Article uses the term “institution” consistent with
dominant practice in academic discourse, see infra text accompanying notes 70-75, which is
itself an institution. See infra notes 68-69 (defining “institution”).
As this broad definition of an institution implies, institutions are a potentially infinite
category. Indeed, many social, cultural, economic, and political factors could be considered
an institution. See infra notes 68-70 (discussing broad scope of the term “institution”). This
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ranging from abstract institutions with informal rules, such as professionalism,
to concrete institutions with formal rules, such as property rights.19 One general
understanding of an institution is that it reflects a practice or structure so
embedded in our society and consciousness that a shorthand reference suffices.20
In a ritual like shaking hands, an aspect of everyday life like paid labor, or a
constitutive process like passing legislation, the rules are clear as to what is
encompassed: reaching out a right hand to greet an acquaintance, receiving an
hourly wage or salary in exchange for work, and crafting laws through political
representatives.21 Notwithstanding this broad definition, what unites
institutional legal scholarship is the understanding that without identifying
relevant institutions and grappling with questions of institutional choice, design,
and friction, any analysis of legal regulation is incomplete.22
To appreciate the striking absence of institutional analysis in family law and
the value of adding this methodological lens, consider one of the most active
debates in family law today: whether and how to confer economic rights on
unmarried partners.23 Currently, cohabitants have far fewer economic rights than
married couples, and courts and legislatures are generally reluctant to impose
more obligations on these couples.24 There are many views on this contentious,
unsettled issue, and the debate is highly complex, in part because cohabitants are
a large and diverse group.25 Scholars have analyzed the issue for years,26 and in
Article focuses on the institutions that play the most salient role in family law but also invites
conversation; indeed, debating the question of which institutions are relevant is part of
bringing institutionalism to family law.
19
See CATHERINE R. ALBISTON, INSTITUTIONAL INEQUALITY AND THE MOBILIZATION OF
THE FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT: RIGHTS ON LEAVE 27-28 (2010) (defining “institution”
and noting that institutions are highly varied, including “the vacation, the 40-hour work week,
or even Tuesday”).
20
See id.
21
See id. at 28.
22
See infra Section I.A.2.
23
For an overview of this issue and a description of the debates around the economic rights
of cohabitants, see Stolzenberg, supra note 1, at 2018-31.
24
See id.
25
Some cohabitants have considerable personal wealth and income, but many do not; some
cohabitants share their resources, but many do not, with varying degrees of separateness; some
cohabitants make a conscious decision to live together, as a step toward marriage, but others
fall into cohabitation, often for economic reasons; some cohabitants have made a principled
decision not to marry, for personal or political reasons, but others have not made a conscious
choice either way; and some cohabitants are committed to each other long-term, but some are
not. See June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Nonmarriage, 76 MD. L. REV. 55, 99-101 (2016).
26
For examples of foundational texts, see CYNTHIA GRANT BOWMAN, UNMARRIED
COUPLES, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY 223 (2010), arguing family law should treat unmarried
couples as married if they live together for two years and have a child; and Ann Laquer Estin,
Ordinary Cohabitation, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1381, 1391-1402 (2001), reviewing court
decisions and finding most courts treat unmarried cohabitants as separate economic units,
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2021, the Uniform Law Commission adopted an act to standardize the economic
rights of cohabitants and ensure consistency across states;27 this act stands a
significant chance of becoming the basis for state legislation across the country.
In this debate about legal rules for cohabitants, scholars and policymakers
raise important doctrinal and theoretical questions, such as whether to base rights
on status or contract and the role of consent in creating legal obligations.28 This
is a useful start to the debate, but it ignores equally key questions. It is difficult
to understand fully the issue of nonmarital economic rights without determining
which institutions influence cohabitation (the descriptive account of the
institutional landscape), how authority should be allocated among potential
decision-making institutions (institutional choice), how these institutions
operate and whether they could be improved (institutional design), and which
institutions will resist and promote law reform in this area (institutional
friction).29
Intentional and structured analysis of these questions would add significant
but missing elements to the debate. Mapping the institutions that influence the
legal regulation of cohabitation, to begin, would highlight the specific legal
institutions, such as legislatures and courts, that establish and currently
administer the rules governing cohabiting couples; relevant social institutions,
such as marriage, against which cohabitation is usually measured; and
foundational economic institutions, such as the family wage, which influences
expectations about economic sharing in marital families.30 The simple exercise
of identifying these core institutions would yield insights, such as the reality that
courts currently—and problematically—dominate the end of cohabiting
relationships, that marriage is still the social yardstick for intimate relationships,
and that economic sharing is an entrenched expectation for married couples but
with claims for spousal support possible but rarely granted, and property typically retained by
whoever paid for it. For examples of more recent work, see Kaiponanea T. Matsumura,
Consent to Intimate Regulation, 96 N.C. L. REV. 1013, 1046-57 (2018), defending the role of
consent in regulating nonmarital relationships; Albertina Antognini, The Law of
Nonmarriage, 58 B.C. L. REV. 1, 58-63 (2017), arguing for a new paradigm beyond marriage
and nonmarriage when assigning property rights; and Carbone & Cahn, supra note 25, at 93107, 112-13, describing with approval the legal distinction between marriage, which treats
spouses as an economic unit, and cohabitation, which treats partners as separate economic
entities, unless they have contracted otherwise.
27
UNIF. COHABITANTS’ ECON. REMEDIES ACT (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2021).
28
See Memorandum from Mary Devine & Craig Stowers, Co-Chairs & Naomi Cahn, Rep.,
to Drafting Comm. on Econ. Rts. of Unmarried Cohabitants, Unif. L. Comm’n 2 (Nov. 13,
2019) (noting issue for drafting committee to address: whether to impose obligations on
cohabitants without their affirmative consent), https://www.uniformlaws.org/HigherLogic
/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=a89890d9-eaf2-51aa-69a7782a03e83e21&forceDialog=0 [https://perma.cc/8TUZ-NQ9A]; Matsumura, supra note 26,
at 1046-58 (discussing theoretical and doctrinal reasons to emphasize consent in regulation of
nonmarital relationships).
29
See, e.g., infra Section I.A.2.
30
See infra Section I.A.
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much less so for cohabitants. This institutional mapping would also reveal that
cohabitation itself is not as institutionalized as marriage and instead is a
heterogeneous phenomenon: some cohabiting couples live together for
relatively brief periods, often for reasons of economic exigency, and without an
explicit social and economic commitment to each other, but other cohabiting
couples have fully integrated their economic and social lives, made an explicit
commitment to each other, and stay together for decades.31 Cohabitation, in
other words, is not a uniform practice so embedded in our society and
consciousness that a shorthand conveys its essence.32
With this descriptive account, scholars and policymakers could consider the
question of institutional choice. The current debate focuses on the substantive
standards governing economic rights, but it does not scrutinize the institutions
that could apply the standard.33 Instead, the assumption is that courts will
adjudicate these claims and that parties will negotiate the issues in the shadow
of the substantive rules.34 But just as different legal rules might make sense for
subpopulations of the diverse group of cohabitants,35 so too will cohabitants
need different fora for adjudicating these rights. Identifying the different
institutions that oversee the end of a cohabiting relationship is essential to
understanding which institutions should do so.
A well-established framework for comparative institutional analysis guides
this inquiry, prompting an examination of the relative benefits and problems
with each potential institution.36 This analysis would demonstrate that the
strengths and weaknesses of an institution are context specific, depending on
which individuals use it and how they do so.37 For cohabitants with economic
means, for example, the institutions of state courts, private settlement
negotiations, and alternative processes such as mediation likely serve their needs

31

See supra note 25 (describing this heterogeneity). Some family law scholars have
observed that cohabitation is underinstitutionalized. See Carbone & Cahn, supra note 25, at
93-94. This engagement, however, tends not to use the explicit methodology of institutional
analysis deployed by legal scholars in other fields.
32
See Carbone & Cahn, supra note 25, at 93-94.
33
See, e.g., Matsumura, supra note 26, at 1071-81 (discussing extension of rights to
unmarried cohabitants).
34
See, e.g., Devine et al., supra note 28, at 2; Antognini, supra note 1, at 62-63 (proposing
framework for economic rights of cohabitants but focusing on judicial context); Matsumura,
supra note 26, at 1071-81 (same).
35
See Devine et al., supra note 28, at 2; Memorandum from Cathy Sakimura, Nat’l Ctr.
for Lesbian Rts. & Courtney Joslin, Professor, U.C. Davis, to the Unif. L. Comm’n Econ. Rts.
of Unmarried Cohabitants Act Comm. 1-4 (Dec. 3, 2019), https://www.uniformlaws.org
/viewdocument/2019-december-committee-meeting [https://perma.cc/BX39-WKJZ].
36
See infra text accompanying notes 85-88 (describing comparative institutional analysis
and framework developed by Neil Komesar). A different institutional choice question asks
which institution does and should decide the content of the substantive rule, but this discussion
focuses on a different question: Once a rule is determined, which institution should apply it?
37
See infra text accompanying notes 85-88.
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well. But for lower-income cohabitants, who will almost certainly be unable to
afford lawyers and who have fewer assets, there may be alternative institutions
that would better serve their interests. Australia, for example, is experimenting
with community-based, nonlegal processes that help separating cohabitants
quickly resolve issues, including economic disputes.38 A focus on institutional
choice would surface these differences, leading to more nuanced and effective
legal regulation.39
It is equally fruitful for scholars and policymakers to examine the design of
the relevant institutions. For any institution—say, family court or communitybased mediation—scholars and policymakers should study its inner workings,
with an eye to improving it. This analysis could look to a rich vein of social
science institutionalism research to understand how institutions operate and the
possibilities for change.40
Finally, exploring institutional friction helps scholars and policymakers
anticipate resistance and support for proposed reforms.41 Scholars often consider
questions of feasibility, but institutionalism both insists on this consideration
and provides a methodology for translating legal research into pragmatic
progress. Any reform effort would need to address the entrenched institutional
interests, such as a matrimonial bar often bent on protecting its hold on the
market for dispute resolution. Similarly, reform efforts would need to anticipate
the stickiness of the institution of marriage, which casts a long shadow over
cohabitation, arguably making it harder to recognize cohabitants. An analysis of
institutional frictions is thus more than a consideration of the political economy
of law reform. It is a holistic and far-ranging inquiry into the institutional factors
that will advance or impede reforms.
As this Article will show, the economic rights of cohabitants is only one
example of the necessity of institutional analysis. But it illustrates the
foundational role of this methodology in legal scholarship and gives a sense at
the outset of the range of valuable insights institutionalism will yield.
In short, this Article calls for an intentional institutional turn in family law,
foregrounding the questions of institutional landscape, choice, design, and
friction that are ubiquitous—but largely unaddressed—in family law. This is not
to say that institutional considerations are completely absent in family law, but
they persist now mostly at the margins and usually without a structured and
rigorous methodology grounded in the multidisciplinary discourse of

38
Family Relationship Centres, FAM. RELATIONSHIPS ONLINE: AN AUSTL. GOV’T
INITIATIVE, https://www.familyrelationships.gov.au/talk-someone/centres [https://perma.cc
/9RQ2-LUAL] (last visited Feb. 4, 2022).
39
When creating legal rules and processes, drafters need not be neutral in shaping which
institution or set of institutions is relatively better positioned to apply the rules and serve the
interests of both the state and a range of different cohabitants. See Stolzenberg, supra note 1,
at 2006 (describing state’s interest in privatizing dependency).
40
See infra text accompanying notes 89-92.
41
See infra text accompanying notes 94-95.
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institutionalism.42 Adding institutional analysis to the field would open new
avenues for productive research and law reform by highlighting important
aspects of debates now largely undertheorized and underanalyzed. And an
institutional turn would provide new tools, vocabulary, and resources for the
discourse, improving both legal debate and family law itself.43
To these ends, the Article proceeds as follows. Part I reviews the
multidisciplinary literature on institutions, explaining how legal scholars use this
work. It then describes the failure of most family law scholars to engage in
explicit institutional analysis. Part II begins the institutional turn in family law
by providing a descriptive account of different categories of institutions that
shape this area of legal regulation. Part III then engages several current debates
in the discourse of family law to demonstrate the relevance of institutional
analysis—leveraging the empirical mapping of the institutional landscape to
focus on questions of choice, design, and friction. The Article concludes by
demonstrating how these inquiries converge, providing a blueprint for scholarly
inquiry and law reform moving forward.
I.

THE UBIQUITY OF INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS

Legal scholars have long engaged with and contributed to a multidisciplinary
literature on institutions, asking questions about institutional choice,
institutional design, and more. This institutional turn, apparent in both public
and private law subjects, is highly generative, producing insights into numerous
legal questions and helping shape legal regulation. By contrast, most family law
scholars overlook institutionalist methodology. This Part traces these
developments, concluding with a description of the few family law scholars who
deploy institutional analysis to make significant contributions to understanding
and reforming family law.
A.

Institutionalism
1.

History and Definitions

Since at least the end of the nineteenth century, scholars in multiple
disciplines, including economics, sociology, and political science, have studied
42
A few family law scholars explicitly deploy the tools of institutional analysis, generating
critical insights. See infra text accompanying notes 100-09 (discussing work of Catherine
Albiston, Maxine Eichner, and Katharine Silbaugh). Across the breadth of family law,
however, most scholars do not, typically ignoring the well-developed literature on
institutionalism within law and across other disciplines. See infra text accompanying notes
96-97. My own scholarship suffers from these shortcomings, as I, too, have not explicitly
deployed institutional methodology.
43
Bringing institutionalism to family law does not mean that every family law scholar
needs to engage with the methodology in every project, nor does it mean institutionalism must
be the center of any given project. See infra text accompanying notes 277-79. But it does
mean that scholars should at least ask whether institutionalist methodology is relevant to the
project and, if so, engage in institutional analysis.
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institutions.44 The work varies by discipline, but the overarching commonality
is an institutional, rather than individualistic or purely theoretical, account of
social, political, and economic arrangements.45 Rather than seeing an individual
as a rational actor with complete agency, or scholarly questions as entirely
abstract, institutional accounts of politics, economics, and human behavior focus
on the context of, and constraints on, choices.46
44
Sociologists and economists were the first scholars to study institutions. In establishing
the field of sociology, Émile Durkheim proposed that scholars should study how institutions
are created and endure. See ÉMILE DURKHEIM, THE RULES OF SOCIOLOGICAL METHOD AND
SELECTED TEXTS ON SOCIOLOGY AND ITS METHOD 38, 45 (Steven Lukes ed., W.D. Halls trans.,
The Free Press 1982). Durkheim argued that sociology should be understood as the “science
of institutions, their genesis and their functioning.” Id. at 45. In economics, Thorstein Veblen
contended that parsimonious economic models that did not account for the influence of
institutions undermined the practical applicability of economic theory. Thorstein Veblen, The
Limitations of Marginal Utility, 17 J. POL. ECON. 620, 621-22 (1909) (“It is characteristic of
the [marginal-utility] school that wherever an element of the cultural fabric, an institution or
any institutional phenomenon, is involved in the facts with which the theory is occupied, such
institutional facts are taken for granted, denied, or explained away.”). Veblen suggested that
instead of assuming static models, economists should engage with the cultural and historical
contingency of institutions, thereby incorporating “human culture” into economic accounts of
growth and change. See id. at 627-29.
Scholars in many disciplines briefly rejected institutionalism in the middle of the twentieth
century in favor of rational-choice methodologies that emphasized individual behavior. See
B. GUY PETERS, INSTITUTIONAL THEORY IN POLITICAL SCIENCE: THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM
12-13 (3d ed. 2012) (describing mid-century interest in rational-choice methodologies in
political science); Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, Introduction to THE NEW
INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 1, 2 (Walter W. Powell & Paul J. DiMaggio
eds., 1991) (“[T]he behavioral revolution of recent decades . . . interpreted collective political
and economic behavior as the aggregate consequence of individual choice. Behavioralists
viewed institutions as epiphenomenal, merely the sum of individual-level properties.”). By
the last quarter of the twentieth century, however, scholars in multiple disciplines had fully
reengaged with an institutional inquiry. See Rubin, supra note 10, at 1393-94; DiMaggio &
Powell, supra, at 2-3 (noting that within some disciplines, especially macrosociology, social
history, and cultural studies, the focus on institutions remained constant).
In light of this history, many disciplines use the qualifier “new” to distinguish the relatively
recent focus on institutions from the original study: within economics, there is new
institutional economics, see generally OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES:
ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS (1975) (coining this term); new institutionalism or
neoinstitutionalism in sociology, see DiMaggio & Powell, supra, at 1-2; and new
institutionalism in political science, see James G. March & Johan P. Olsen, The New
Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life, 78 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 734, 738
(1984) (discussing return within political science field to study of institutions and calling this
“new institutionalism”).
45
See DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 44, at 3.
46
In political science, new institutionalism explores ways in which individuals and
institutions dynamically influence each other in political systems. See PETERS, supra note 44,
at 5, 26; see also JAMES G. MARCH & JOHAN P. OLSEN, REDISCOVERING INSTITUTIONS: THE
ORGANIZATIONAL BASIS OF POLITICS 17 (1989) (“Political democracy depends not only on
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economic and social conditions but also on the design of political institutions.”). See generally
Peter A. Hall & Rosemary C.R. Taylor, Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms,
44 POL. STUD. 936 (1996) (describing three strands within new institutionalism).
New institutional economics is based on the insight that transaction costs—including
information, bargaining, and enforcement costs—are the driving force behind the choice to
conduct business through different institutions, including contracts on the market or through
a firm. See R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 390-93 (1937); L.J.
Alston, New Institutional Economics, in 6 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS
32-39 (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2d ed. 2008) (describing this basis for
new institutional economics); R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1519 (1960) (identifying transaction costs as driving force behind structure of different
economic institutions and comparing ability of different institutions, notably market and state,
to regulate externalities). Oliver Williamson and others picked up on this insight,
reinvigorating the focus on the comparative ability of different institutions—particularly the
market and the state—to regulate externalities. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 44, at 1-19. In
the new institutional economics account, institutions arise and persist because they confer an
advantage in managing these costs, providing a more efficient and reliable framework for
transactions. See, e.g., Coase, The Nature of the Firm, supra, at 390-93.
Like economics, new institutionalism in sociology rejects an “agent-centric” account of
change and instead gives primacy to institutional arrangements. See Victor Nee & Paul
Ingram, Embeddedness and Beyond: Institutions, Exchange, and Social Structure, in THE
NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN SOCIOLOGY 19, 20-33 (Mary C. Brinton & Victor Nee eds., 1998).
Sociologists use the in-depth, on-the-ground study that is characteristic of the discipline to
develop rich accounts of how institutions work, including the relationship between formal and
informal rules governing institutions. See W. RICHARD SCOTT, INSTITUTIONS AND
ORGANIZATIONS: IDEAS, INTERESTS, AND IDENTITIES, at xi-xiii (4th ed. 2014); John W. Meyer
& Brian Rowan, Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony,
in THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS, supra note 44, at 41, 41-63.
Sociologists study many different institutions, but some focus on racism, patriarchy, and
classism. See, e.g., Ian F. Haney López, Institutional Racism: Judicial Conduct and a New
Theory of Racial Discrimination, 109 YALE L.J. 1717, 1807 (2000) (quoting MARY DOUGLAS,
HOW INSTITUTIONS THINK 48 (1986), for contention that notions of racial hierarchy become
institutionalized by claiming basis in nature); Jessica E. Birch, Gender as Institution, in 3 THE
WILEY BLACKWELL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GENDER AND SEXUALITY STUDIES, 1052, 1052-56
(Nancy A. Naples, renée c. hoogland, Maithree Wickramasinghe & Wai Ching Angela Wong
eds., 2016) (describing scholarly debate about gender as institution); J. Kenneth Benson &
Byung-Soo Kim, Institutionalism and Capitalism in Organization Studies 2-9 (2007)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (describing capitalism as an institution).
Organizational theorists examine how the practices of organizations become
institutionalized over time and resistant to change. See DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 44, at
11-15. For a brief overview of the field of organizational theory, see generally Neil Fligstein,
Organizations: Theoretical Debates and the Scope of Organizational Theory (Aug. 2001)
(unpublished manuscript) (available at https://sociology.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files
/faculty/fligstein/inter.handbook.paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y2CM-A3B5]). Insight from
this field demonstrates that institutions both constrain and empower human action, institutions
do not transfer easily to different cultural and political contexts, and strong local institutions
may hinder the development of macroinstitutions. See DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 44, at
28-29; Ronald L. Jepperson, Institutions, Institutional Effects, and Institutionalism, in THE
NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS, supra note 44, at 143, 146. Further,
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In law, the study of institutions began with legal scholars and judges debating
the relative competencies of courts and legislatures as decision makers.47 Legal
Process scholars developed these ideas, elevating questions of institutional
choice and institutional design.48 As commentators have since argued, Legal
Process institutional analyses were relatively unsophisticated,49 but they did
introduce comparative institutionalism into legal scholarship.
Now nearly ubiquitous in legal scholarship,50 institutionalism’s basic insight
is that law does not occur in the abstract but instead is created, implemented, and
influenced by specific legal bodies and within specific social and economic
structures. Take First Amendment discourse: Institutionalists in the field identify
the institutions that make it possible for individuals to exercise speech, religious,
and associational rights.51 For freedom of speech, schools and universities
scholars have assessed the role of power within institutions, positing that key players within
an institution benefit from the continued existence of the institution, and that a weakened
institution will try to retain control by both acculturating newcomers and seeking
reinforcement of the institution from the state. See DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 44, at 3031.
47
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, An Historical and Critical Introduction to
HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW, at li, lix-lxii (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey
eds., The Found. Press 1994) (tent. ed. 1958) (describing Justice Brandeis’s argument that
judges could not and should not make policy decisions and instead should defer to legislative
policies, and Dean James Landis’s contention that legislatures should delegate line-drawing
questions to agencies with courts deferring to these judgments).
48
Id. at xciv-xcv (describing contention of Legal Process theorists that members of
pluralist society will disagree about what law should be, and therefore it is critical to have
clear and consistent process for determining content of the law). This focus developed into
the theory of institutional settlement, which holds that substantive decisions about the law
should be assigned to institutions depending on their relative capacities, and once a decision
has been made, other institutions should respect it even if the second institution would have
reached a different conclusion. See id. at xcv-xcvi.
49
See, e.g., NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN
LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 4-5, 11-12 (1994) (noting Hart and Sacks compared
institutions of the executive, legislature, and judiciary but used “largely idealized image of
institutions” and thus “assume[d] away most of the difficulty and richness of institutional
choice”); ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF
LEGAL INTERPRETATION 9-10 (2006) (arguing that Legal Process theorists used “stylized” or
“asymmetrical institutionalism,” which inaccurately portray functioning of institutions and
that such an account is necessary and leads in different direction than Legal Process). There
is some evidence that the early accounts of institutions in other fields also lacked rigor. See
DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 44, at 2 (describing how behavioralists “viewed institutions
as epiphenomenal, merely the sum of individual-level properties,” while neglecting “social
context and the durability of social institutions”).
50
Rubin, supra note 10, at 1393-94, 1424 (suggesting institutionalism as a “a new unified
methodology for legal scholarship”).
51
For a discussion in the context of freedom of speech and the right of association, see
PAUL HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS 3 (2013). See also id. at 5-7, 49-67
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expose individuals to ideas and train them to think critically and methodically;
libraries provide access to new ideas; and newspapers, book publishers, and the
internet allow an individual to communicate with others, leading to an exchange
of views and possibly the formation of new views.52 For the freedom of religion,
places of faith allow individuals to come together to learn about and develop
religious beliefs and exercise those beliefs.53 And for the freedom of association,
political groups allow individuals to join with others to advance common
purposes.54 Scholars use this institutional mapping to develop arguments about
the law, contending, for example, that First Amendment doctrine should grant
distinctive rights to the press, universities, and libraries, or should treat religious
entities as largely immune from government regulation.55
Across public and private law, scholars have taken an institutional turn,
adding to and drawing on well-developed multidisciplinary literature. The

(critiquing standard story of First Amendment as acontextual, focusing largely on individual
and state but not institutions); id. at 8 (noting as descriptive matter “a good deal of the speech
and conduct that makes up some of the most important aspects of the lived world of First
Amendment activity takes place through institutions”); Joseph Blocher, Institutions in the
Marketplace of Ideas, 57 DUKE L.J. 821, 827-29 (2008) (proposing “New Institutional First
Amendment” theory). See generally Frederick Schauer, Towards an Institutional First
Amendment, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1256 (2005) (introducing “Institutional First Amendment”
theory). A similar discourse arises in the context of freedom of religion. Compare Richard W.
Garnett, Do Churches Matter? Towards an Institutional Understanding of the Religion
Clauses, 53 VILL. L. REV. 273, 293 (2008) (“[A]n appropriately institutional approach to the
Religion Clauses would involve attention to the religious-freedom rights of religious
entities . . . .”), with Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Against Religious
Institutionalism, 99 VA. L. REV. 917, 919 (2013) (arguing against institutional understanding
of religion clauses).
52
HORWITZ, supra note 51, at 13-15, 107-10, 144-51, 194-98.
53
See Garnett, supra note 51, at 274 (“Like the freedom of speech, religious freedom has
and requires an infrastructure. Like free expression, it is not exercised only by individuals;
like free expression, its exercise requires more than an individual with something to say; like
free expression, it involves more than protecting a solitary conscience. The freedom of
religion is not only lived and experienced through institutions, it is also protected and
nourished by them.”). But see Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 51, at 921 (“We argue
that ‘freedom of the church’ relies on selective history, violates basic republican political
principles, has no limiting principle, and fails to explain why churches are different from other
mediating institutions.”).
54
See HORWITZ, supra note 51, at 211-24.
55
See, e.g., id. at 10, 128-41, 171-73, 188-89; see also supra notes 51, 53 (describing
debate among scholars about whether courts should view freedom of religion through
institutionalist lens).
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institutional turn is apparent in statutory interpretation,56 property law,57
antidiscrimination law,58 criminal law,59 law and economics,60 federalism,61

56

This has been a particularly active area of institutional analysis. See William N.
Eskridge, Jr., No Frills Textualism, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2041, 2044-51 (2006) (reviewing
VERMEULE, supra note 49) (identifying three distinct institutional turns in statutory
interpretation scholarship: (1) the Legal Process school, which focused on relative
institutional capacities of courts, legislatures, and agencies; (2) post-1950s institutional turn,
which identified illegitimacy of state institutions because of their failure to represent
interests—and sometimes active oppression—of women and marginalized groups; and
(3) introduction of new institutional economics as applied to statutory interpretation, which
brought rigorous cost-benefit analysis to assessment of relative capacities of state institutions
as decision makers). For a book-length treatment of the subject, see generally VERMEULE,
supra note 49, positing that the field of statutory interpretation needs to consider more
rigorously the institutional capacities of decision makers, including the potential for error by
courts, the costs of different interpretive methods, and the difficulty of members of the
judiciary coordinating to adopt a unified method of statutory interpretation, and therefore
arguing for courts to engage in parsimonious statutory interpretation and, when in doubt about
a statute’s meaning, defer to agency interpretation.
57
Building on the work of Ronald Coase, property law has long been a focus of scholars
of new institutional economics. For a brief summary, see Henry E. Smith, Law and
Institutional and Organizational Economics, SOC’Y FOR INSTITUTIONAL & ORGANIZATIONAL
ECON.,
https://www.sioe.org/field/law-and-institutional-and-organizational-economics
[https://perma.cc/ZUS3-8BRM] (last visited Feb. 4, 2022).
58
See, e.g., Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural
Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 462-63 (2001) (deploying institutional analysis to
describe and argue in favor of emerging approach to second-generation employment
discrimination “that encourages the development of institutions and processes to enact general
norms in particular contexts”); Haney López, supra note 46, at 1723-29, 1806-09 (drawing
on new institutionalism in sociology to develop “theory of institutional racism”).
59
See, e.g., Robert Weisberg, Empirical Criminal Law Scholarship and the Shift to
Institutions, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1374-75, 1383-88 (2013) (describing empirical work in
criminal law that focuses on institutions, such as research on mass incarceration, deterrence,
recidivism, selection of prosecutors and judges, and responsibility for costs of incarceration).
60
See KOMESAR, supra note 49, at 10 (arguing that comparative institutional analysis is
“clearly related” to law and economics and that “the most powerful insights to be gained from
the economic analysis of the law come from comparative institutional analysis”).
61
See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 NW. U. L. REV.
727, 727-30 (2008) (proposing role for agencies in preemption doctrine, which previously
was solely dominated by courts); Ernest A. Young, Making Federalism Doctrine: Fidelity,
Institutional Competence, and Compensating Adjustments, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1733,
1816-53 (2005) (exploring “distinctive institutional capabilities of courts, legislatures, and
executive actors, and ask[ing] how these different capacities bear on federalism questions”).

408

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 102:393

Second Amendment law,62 administrative law,63 election law,64 intellectual
property,65 international economic law,66 and tort law,67 to give a long but by no
means exhaustive list.
Defining an institution varies somewhat by discipline,68 but a common
understanding is that an institution is the set of “humanly devised constraints
62
See Darrell A.H. Miller, Institutions and the Second Amendment, 66 DUKE L.J. 69, 73
(2016) (arguing for institutional turn in Second Amendment doctrine and demonstrating
insights, such as allowing judges to “recognize and potentially defer to salient organizations,
rules, traditions, and norms,” i.e., the militia; the home; the city; the school, the university,
and the church; shooting, sporting, and guns-rights organizations; police, policing, and public
carry; and self-defense, “that both facilitate and constrain Second Amendment activity”).
63
See Nestor M. Davidson, Localist Administrative Law, 126 YALE L.J. 564, 574-79
(2017) (describing institutionalist turn in federal administrative law and calling for similar
institutional turn in local-government legal scholarship and highlighting “the exploration of
common themes in new institutional settings” and the provision of “new grounds to
complicate longstanding assumptions about the implications of federal structure and
practice”).
64
See HEATHER K. GERKEN, THE DEMOCRACY INDEX: WHY OUR ELECTION SYSTEM IS
FAILING AND HOW TO FIX IT 1-10 (2009) (arguing for nonjudicial institutions to play role in
election law); Richard L. Hasen, Election Administration Reform and the New
Institutionalism, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1075, 1087-88 (2010) (reviewing GERKEN, supra)
(describing work of some election law scholars who look to new institutions, including
electoral advisory commissions, to make changes to election administration).
65
See Paul R. Gugliuzza, IP Injury and the Institutions of Patent Law, 98 IOWA L. REV.
747, 749-50, 750 n.18, 769 (2013) (reviewing CHRISTINA BOHANNAN & HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT RESTRAINT: PROMOTING LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN
INNOVATION (2012)) (collecting sources that reflect institutional approach to patent law and
demonstrating insights from institutionalism, such as analysis of “how institutional structure
affects substantive law” and the identification of the government body that is best suited to
“resolve the IP crisis and return IP law to its constitutional roots of protecting and promoting
innovation”).
66
See SUSAN BLOCK-LIEB & TERENCE C. HALLIDAY, GLOBAL LAWMAKERS:
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE CRAFTING OF WORLD MARKETS 1-21 (2017)
(reporting findings from socio-legal empirical study of United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law based on many years of observation of the body); Gregory Shaffer
& Joel Trachtman, Interpretation and Institutional Choice at the WTO, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 103,
105 (2011) (conducting comparative institutional analysis of World Trade Organization).
67
See Richard B. Stewart, Crisis in Tort Law? The Institutional Perspective, 54 U. CHI. L.
REV. 184, 190-95 (1987) (supporting institutionalism as method of analyzing tort liability and
insurance).
68
For examples of definitions in different disciplines, see ROBERT N. BELLAH, RICHARD
MADSEN, WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN, ANN SWIDLER & STEVEN M. TIPTON, THE GOOD SOCIETY 10
(1991) (“In its formal sociological definition, an institution is a pattern of expected action of
individuals or groups enforced by social sanctions, both positive and negative.”); DOUGLASS
C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 3 (James Alt
& Douglass North eds., 1990) (defining institutions in context of political decision-making as
“the rules of the game in a society”); DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 44, at 7-8, 28 (describing
different definitions by discipline and noting institutions are both constraints on human action
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that structure human interaction.”69 This broad definition encompasses political,
social, and economic institutions, ranging from the practice of gift-giving (an
abstract institution without formal rules) to the adjudicative process (a concrete
institution with formal rules).70 Institutions generally have three components:
normative, regulative, and cognitive.71 Consider the two institutions just
mentioned—gifts and adjudication: the normative component of the institution
tells a person how they should act,72 the regulative component provides rules to
guide action,73 and the cognitive component relieves a person of conscious
thought because compliance is routine.74 As this broad definition implies, a
seemingly infinite number of practices and arrangements could qualify as
institutions. Accordingly, scholars use varying degrees of specificity depending
on the context and particular inquiry.75
and products of human action); James G. March & Johan P. Olsen, Elaborating the “New
Institutionalism,” in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS 3, 3 (R.A.W.
Rhodes, Sarah A. Binder & Bert A. Rockman eds., 2006) (defining an institution as “a
relatively enduring collection of rules and organized practices, embedded in structures of
meaning and resources that are relatively invariant in the face of turnover”). For scholars
discussing different and potentially conflicting definitions, see Daniel H. Cole, The Varieties
of Comparative Institutional Analysis, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 383, 388-93; and Oliver E.
Williamson, The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead, 38 J. ECON. LIT.
595, 595 (2000).
69
North, supra note 18, at 360; see also ALBISTON, supra note 19, at 27 (“In sociological
terms, an institution is more than just a hospital, firm, or university. It is a set of
complementary social practices and meanings that form taken-for-granted background rules
that shape social life.”).
70
See ALBISTON, supra note 19, at 27-33.
71
See infra text accompanying notes 72-74.
72
Sociologists emphasize the normative aspect of institutions, partly due to their focus on
kinship and religious systems, where values are omnipresent and highly influential. See
ALBISTON, supra note 69, at 27-28 (describing normative aspect of institutions and noting
“[p]eople come to believe that institutionalized practices are correct, fair, and appropriate”);
SCOTT, supra note 46, at 19.
73
See SCOTT, supra note 46, at 33. Economists emphasize the regulative aspect of
institutions. See id. at 35; see also NORTH, supra note 68, at 4 (“[Institutions] are perfectly
analogous to the rules of the game in a competitive team sport. That is, they consist of formal
written rules as well as typically unwritten codes of conduct . . . .”).
74
Anthropologists and sociologists emphasize the cognitive aspect of an institution. See
ALBISTON, supra note 19, at 27-28 (describing this aspect of institutions and noting that
although these cognitive shortcuts make thought more efficient, they also “constrain[] the
available choices”); DOUGLAS, supra note 46, at 52 (contending an institution begins as a
behavioral convention and, when combined with a cognitive counterpart, becomes an
institution, appearing as natural, not human-made); SCOTT, supra note 46, at 43.
75
Scholars across disciplines sometimes conceive of institutions at a high level of
generality, comparing the institutions of market processes, political processes, and
adjudicative processes, for example. See KOMESAR, supra note 49, at 9-10. In other instances,
scholars find a granular taxonomy more useful, such as dividing the market into firms, spot
markets, futures markets, and so on. See id. Depending on the context, legal scholars also use
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Many scholars distinguish an institution from an organization.76 As the
economist Douglass North notes, “institutions are the rules of the game, [and]
organizations . . . are the players.”77 Thus, the legislative process is a political
institution, and the U.S. Congress is an organization; paid labor is an economic
institution, and Walmart is an organization; religion is a social institution, and
the Catholic Church is an organization.78 As in other disciplines, some legal
scholars make this same distinction,79 but there is lingering uncertainty about the
precise definition of an institution and some scholars use the terms “institution”
and “organization” more interchangeably.80

a general or more specific conception of the relevant institutions. Legal Process scholars, for
example, typically compare the competence of legislatures, courts, and administrative
agencies. See supra text accompanying notes 47-49. By contrast, an institutional analysis of
the First Amendment might focus on somewhat more discrete institutions, such as the media
and education. See supra text accompanying notes 51-55.
76
See Cole, supra note 68, at 395 (listing leading scholars in multiple disciplines who do
and do not differentiate between organizations and institutions); see also March & Olsen,
supra note 68, at 3 (noting that within political science, new institutionalism views institutions
as a “collection of rules and organized practices” that are “relatively resilient to the
idiosyncratic preferences and expectations of individuals”). Early institutionalists did not
distinguish between institutions and organizations, but the new institutionalism across
disciplines, which began in the middle of the twentieth century with the emergence of
organizational theory, generally does make this distinction. See SCOTT, supra note 46, at 14,
16. Organizational theory posits that an organization becomes an institution (hence the verb
“institutionalize”) when the values surrounding the organization surpass the needs of the
organization. See id. at 18. The field of institutional and organizational economics, however,
studies both institutions and organizations and is less concerned with the demarcation between
the two. See id. at 21-54.
77
North, supra note 18, at 361. North also contends that institutions shape organizations.
Id. (“The organizations that come into existence will reflect the opportunities provided by the
institutional matrix. That is, if the institutional framework rewards piracy then piratical
organizations will come into existence; and if the institutional framework rewards productive
activities then organizations—firms—will come into existence to engage in productive
activities.”).
78
See id. (“Organizations include political bodies (e.g., political parties, the Senate, a city
council, regulatory bodies), economic bodies (e.g., firms, trade unions, family farms,
cooperatives)[,] social bodies (e.g., churches, clubs, athletic associations), and educational
bodies (e.g., schools, universities, vocational training centers).”).
79
See, e.g., Blocher, supra note 51, at 842 (distinguishing organization, such as a specific
university, from institution, such as academia; further arguing “[i]nstitutions set the rules”
whereas “[o]rganizations follow and . . . apply them”); see also Zoë Robinson, What Is a
“Religious Institution”?, 55 B.C. L. REV. 181, 185 (2014) (“[I]t is surprising that there has
yet to be any serious attempt to define a ‘religious institution’ for First Amendment
purposes.”).
80
In practice, legal scholars often conflate the distinction or use the term “institution” more
colloquially to refer to what a strict institutionalist would define as an organization. See, e.g.,
HORWITZ, supra note 51, at 11 (acknowledging North’s distinction between institution and
organization but noting that his analysis uses “institution” to refer to what institutional
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Despite uncertainty at the margins about definitional boundaries, the term
“institution” has proven a useful label to describe a set of social, economic, and
political practices, facilitating examination of law and policy, as the next Section
illustrates.
2.

Four Questions

There are numerous aspects of institutionalist methodology in legal
scholarship, but for present purposes, four core questions are particularly
relevant to family law.
Institutional landscape. The foundation of institutional analysis is empirical,
identifying the broad range of institutions that shape a given area of the law.81
This descriptive work can reveal hidden forces that influence the law, prompting
debates about which institutions play a role and laying the groundwork for other
aspects of institutional analysis.82 Depending on the goal of the analysis,
scholars expand or contract the breadth of relevant institutions, but descriptive
accounts of the relevant institutions in an area of the law, standing alone,
contribute to the literature.83
Institutional choice. Legal scholars analyze how authority is and should be
allocated among the relevant institutions. Legal Process scholars first invited
institutional comparison,84 and over time, other scholars have refined the
inquiry. A classic account from the new institutional economics scholar Neil
Komesar is particularly helpful. To advance public policy, Komesar contends, it
is insufficient to identify a goal and underlying values; instead, it is imperative
to compare the possible institutions that could implement the policy.85 Komesar
is adamant that what he calls “single institutional analysis”—the examination of
an institution in a vacuum—is problematic and misleading because any
assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of an institution is incomplete

literature would term an organization: The Washington Post, for example, as well as more
general category of newspapers); Cole, supra note 68, at 395 tbl.1 (classifying Neil Komesar
as legal scholar who includes organizations within definition of “institutions”).
81
See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 51-55 (describing work of First Amendment
scholars to identify institutions relevant to First Amendment law).
82
See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 51-55.
83
See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 51-55.
84
See supra text accompanying notes 47-49 (discussing how Legal Process scholars
argued that central question for law is which institution should decide substance of law and
how those decisions should be treated by other institutions).
85
KOMESAR, supra note 49, at 271; id. at 5 (“Goal choice and institutional choice are both
essential for law and public policy. They are inextricably related.”). Komesar is quick to point
out that while he did not invent the idea of comparative institutional analysis, his contribution
is to argue for a structured and rigorous comparison and to show the dangers of failing to do
so. Id. at ix-x. As Komesar puts it, institutional choice is the question of who decides, and
“institutional” means “what decides”: the “complex processes, such as the political process,
the market process, and the adjudicative process.” Id. at 3.
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if it is not weighed against a similar assessment of alternative institutions.86 No
one institution will be ideal, and thus the comparison is between “imperfect
alternatives.”87 Institutional choice is unavoidable, he argues, and the only
question is whether the choice will be conscious and rigorous or unconscious
and indiscriminate.88
Institutional design. Legal scholars also explore the complexities of how
institutions operate, usually with the goal of changing an institution to make it
more effective.89 In lieu of thin and idealized accounts used by early
institutionalists,90 legal scholars today argue that only a rich, realistic account of
an institution leads to convincing theories and insights.91 Understanding
institutional design is essential for comparative analysis, as well as for efforts to
improve the functioning of any given institution through law reform. In this way,

86

See id. at 19-22.
See id. at 5. To compare these alternatives, Komesar offers an analytical framework that
requires a careful analysis of the costs and benefits of participating in each institution. See id.
at 7 (terming this “the participation-centered approach”). In this approach, the analyst
examines each possible institution, focusing on the actions and interactions of the people in
the institution, be they voters, consumers, litigants, etc., and, to a lesser degree, the actions of
government officials. The analyst identifies the benefits and costs of participating in the
institution. The analyst can then conduct a further microanalysis of each institution. See id. at
7-8. This process is repeated for each potential institution. Komesar contends that his
framework is widely applicable to both public policy and the resolution of specific legal
questions, such as the preferred reach of tort liability and the proper method of constitutional
interpretation. See id. at 11, 153-231, 271.
88
See id. at 11.
89
See Reich, supra note 16, at 812-13 (describing legal scholarship on institutional
design). Institutional design, for example, shows how institutions both empower and constrain
their members. In their study of judging, Edward Rubin and Malcom Feeley identify the
institutional constraints on judges that influence their law-making actions. See Edward Rubin
& Malcolm Feeley, Creating Legal Doctrine, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1989, 1992-96 (1996); see
also id. at 1991 (“The new institutionalism explores the functional and dysfunctional elements
of institutional structure as created by and embedded in complex social environments.”). As
Rubin and Feeley explain, institutions provide scripts and clear expectations—both formal
and informal—for the actors in the institution and these expectations are enforced by other
members of the institution. These expectations originate outside the actor but are soon
internalized, clarifying the reach but also the limits of the person’s power. See id. at 1996-98,
2026-32.
90
See supra text accompanying note 49 (describing critique of Legal Process scholars,
who developed thin accounts of institutions); see also Reich, supra note 16, at 812 (“Whereas
formalists and Legal Process scholars of an earlier era had assumed a sort of heroic quality on
the part of many institutions, modern institutionalists took the perspective that every
institution is in its own way imperfect.”).
91
See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 56, at 2049-50 (critiquing Adrian Vermeule’s Judging
Under Uncertainty because Vermeule idealized decision-making capacities of agencies and
did not rest his argument on detailed analysis of agencies).
87
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an analysis of institutional design can reveal shortcomings of legal regulation,
as well as more promising alternatives.92
Institutional friction. Finally, legal scholars understand that reforming the law
is not simply a matter of choosing the best legal rule or policy but rather a
complex process that inevitably implicates vested interests.93 Institutional
analysis helps scholars anticipate which institutions are likely to promote or
impede a proposed reform.94 With this understanding of institutional friction,
legal scholars can advance law reform more successfully and better strategize to
resist reforms that scholars deem undesirable.95
B.

Institutionalism in Family Law: The Rare Case

Most family law scholars do not draw on the rigorous and structured
institutional methodology described above, myself included. In my work on
child maltreatment, for example, I have argued that the footprint of the child
welfare system should be much smaller, focusing on the most egregious cases
and, for the remaining cases, offering supportive programs for parents rather
than coercive state intervention.96 Consistent with the work of other scholars, I
92
In the area of employment discrimination, for example, Susan Sturm argues that the
dominant institution of the adjudicative process is ill-suited to modern forms of
discrimination, which tend to be structural. See Sturm, supra note 58, at 537-53; see also id.
at 553-66 (describing emerging alternative in which different institutions—employers,
employees, and third-party mediating organizations—work together to develop effective
solutions tailored to specific workplaces that addresses structural issues at root of
discrimination).
93
See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 56-67 (describing institutionalist debates in
legal scholarship, including inevitable trade-offs in vested interests).
94
See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, Institutional Formalism and Realism in Constitutional and
Public Law, 2013 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 32 (describing insights generated by institutionally
sensitive account of political economy of different law reform efforts).
95
For an example, see David Freeman Engstrom’s institutionally based retelling of a failed
proposal to reform consumer class actions focused on the roles of different institutions and
organizations. David Freeman Engstrom, Jacobins at Justice: The (Failed) Class Action
Revolution of 1978 and the Puzzle of American Procedural Political Economy, 165 U. PA. L.
REV. 1531, 1541-63 (2017) (examining actions of Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil
Procedure, Judicial Conference of the United States, Congress, plaintiffs’ bar and other
interest groups, state attorneys general, and federal agencies, and identifying institutional
resistance to change, comparative advantages of different institutions leading reform efforts,
and challenges and potential benefits of polycentric rulemaking regime).
96
See Clare Huntington, Mutual Dependency in Child Welfare, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1485, 1512-24 (2007); Clare Huntington, Rights Myopia in Child Welfare, 53 UCLA L. REV.
637, 666-72 (2006) [hereinafter Huntington, Rights Myopia]. Other scholars have made
similar arguments. See, e.g., MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT’S WRONG WITH CHILDREN’S
RIGHTS 199-201 (2005) (arguing in favor of addressing poverty as preventive means for child
abuse and neglect); DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE
268 (2002) (“The ingredients for a strong child welfare program are clear and simple: first,
reduce family poverty by increasing the minimum wage, instituting a guaranteed income, and
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contended that the overly broad brush of the child welfare system contributes to
biased and unnecessary intervention in the lives of families of color.97 My
scholarship thus addresses the issues of when the state should intervene in family
life and when it should not. But like most family law scholars in contemporary
debates, I did not map relevant institutions, compare them, evaluate their design,
or contemplate the frictions they present.
In contrast to other fields of law, only a small handful of family law scholars
explicitly deploy institutionalist methodology. Some scholars address a single
institution or subset of institutions,98 and institutional choice is implicit in some
enacting aggressive job creation policies; second, establish a system of national health
insurance that covers everyone; third, provide high-quality subsidized child care, preschool
education, and paid parental leave for all families. Increasing the supply of affordable housing
is also critical.”); Maxine Eichner, Children, Parents, and the State: Rethinking Relationships
in the Child Welfare System, 12 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 448, 459 (2005) (arguing for
supportive approach to majority of families in child welfare system); Marsha Garrison,
Reforming Child Protection: A Public Health Perspective, 12 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 590,
595, 611-35 (2005) (arguing in favor of orienting child welfare system toward public health
model that would analyze and determine needed reforms rather than current system, which is
based on “acute care” medical model where treatment is contemplated as “rapid cure and
exit”; this approach would further understanding of child abuse and neglect as problems that
require extensive and far-ranging help for parent as well as child, and, centrally, emphasize
prevention).
97
See Huntington, Rights Myopia, supra note 96, at 656-58. For foundational critiques
advancing this claim, see ROBERTS, supra note 96, at 14-25; and Michael Wald, State
Intervention on Behalf of “Neglected” Children: A Search for Realistic Standards, 27 STAN.
L. REV. 985, 1000-04 (1975), arguing that broad statutory definitions of neglect increase the
likelihood of unnecessary or even harmful state intervention. For examples of more recent
scholarship, see David Pimentel, Criminal Child Neglect and the “Free Range Kid”: Is
Overprotective Parenting the New Standard of Care?, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 947, 973-76,
describing how vague neglect statutes pit jurors’ parenting preferences against those of
defendants; and Cynthia Godsoe & Carissa Hessick, Vague Neglect 1-2 (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author), criticizing vague neglect statutes for, among other things,
inadequately distinguishing between parenting choices and criminal behavior.
98
We might think of this as narrow institutionalism. Janet Halley’s genealogy of family
law, for example, explores how the family became an institution and the impact of this
institutionalization on the law, most notably that it justified treating marriage as a status rather
than a contract. Janet Halley, What Is Family Law?: A Genealogy (pts. 1 & 2), 23 YALE J.L.
& HUMANS. 1, 12-26, 51 (2011), 23 YALE J.L. & HUMANS. 189, 216, 254-55 (2011)
(describing as well role of other institutions in reconceptualization of family law in the 1950s,
with professional associations revitalizing and rebranding field). Carl Schneider’s
foundational account of family law emphasizes that the law creates or reinforces social
institutions in the family, such as marriage and parenthood, and then encourages people to
join these institutions by giving legal effect to the institutions and rewarding participation in
them. See Carl E. Schneider, The Channelling Function in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV.
495, 496-511 (1992). This narrow institutionalism acknowledges the value of an institutional
lens and deploys some aspects of the methodology, but the scholarship typically takes a
cramped view of the relevant institutions rather than starting with a broad descriptive account
of family law’s institutions. It thus misses the larger ecology of family law and the multiple
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scholarship,99 but the few scholars who fully embrace institutionalism deeply
enrich family law debates.

forces that can impact the law. Some scholars have invited an analysis of institutions but
without focusing on institutionalism as a methodology. See, e.g., Martha Albertson Fineman,
The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition, 20 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 1, 1-15, 12 n.31 (2008) (arguing for reassessment of institutions that manage human
vulnerabilities, including analysis of how “asset-conferring institutions,” such as those
governing health, education, and employment, ensure that all individuals are receiving the
societal goods necessary for well-being and further contending that a policy analysis must
look at institutions because they “are simultaneously constituted by and producers of
vulnerability”).
99
The Legal Process theory of institutional settlement is so woven into the law, see, e.g.,
supra text accompanying notes 47-49 (describing this theory), it is unsurprising that in the
debates about marriage equality, scholars deliberated whether courts, legislatures, or citizens
through the ballot box should decide the contours of legal marriage. Compare Lynn D.
Wardle, The Judicial Imposition of Same-Sex Marriage: The Boundaries of Judicial
Legitimacy and Legitimate Redefinition of Marriage, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 79, 100 (2010)
(arguing against judicial activism in redefining marriage), with Kenji Yoshino, The Paradox
of Political Power: Same-Sex Marriage and the Supreme Court, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 527, 543
(supporting judicial intervention in marriage equality cases). This was considered in
Obergefell v. Hodges itself. See 576 U.S. 644, 708-11 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
(arguing marriage equality was not an issue for courts to decide but rather for states through
democratic process).
Similarly, in doctrinal debates, scholars may touch upon questions of institutional choice.
In his classic critique of the best-interests standard governing child custody decisions, Robert
Mnookin contended that the standard is indeterminate and that family courts lack the
competence to make accurate, reliable decisions using the standard. See Robert H. Mnookin,
Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 226, 261-62, 269-70 (1975). Mnookin detailed the shortcomings of judicial
decision-making, but he only briefly touched on alternative decision-making institutions, see
id. at 292, thus treating the institutional choice question as an afterthought. Similarly,
Elizabeth Scott’s work proposing a standard that bases custody on an approximation of past
caretaking focuses primarily on the benefits of the substantive standard as compared with
other substantive rules, addressing the institutional decision maker as a subsidiary issue. See
Elizabeth S. Scott, Pluralism, Parental Preference, and Child Custody, 80 CALIF. L. REV.
615, 638, 649-50 (1992) (listing one argument in favor of proposed approximation rule as
difficulty of judge making best interests determination as compared with judge’s ability to
determine past caretaking and noting that parties can also apply standard in settlement
negotiations). Scott and a coauthor come closer to a comparative institutional analysis in later
work, but this work focuses on only two institutions—judicial decision-making and mental
health testimony—and does not explicitly deploy a rigorous framework to guide the
comparison. See Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Emery, Gender Politics and Child Custody:
The Puzzling Persistence of the Best-Interests Standard, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 69, 91100 (2014) (identifying shortcomings of mental health professionals as custody decision
makers).
This kind of work rarely places institutional issues at the center of analysis and typically
does not deploy the frameworks developed by other legal scholars to guide a comparative
institutional analysis. See supra text accompanying notes 85-88 (describing this framework).
As a result, the Legal Process analysis is less rigorous and intentional than it could be.
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To appreciate what is gained when family law scholars use this methodology,
consider the debate about the state’s role in helping families balance the
demands of paid labor and caregiving. The few scholars who turn to institutional
analysis to explore this problem make distinctive contributions to the debate.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, these scholars often have interdisciplinary training and
thus are familiar with the institutional literature in other disciplines.
Maxine Eichner, a legal scholar and political scientist, interrogates the
institutions that play a role in supporting families to meet their basic needs.100 In
The Free-Market Family, for example, Eichner examines the institutional
differences between countries, showing that the United States relies primarily
on markets to meet the basic needs of families, whereas other wealthy countries,
particularly in Europe, rely on the state to distribute resources to families.101 As
she demonstrates, the European model profoundly benefits children, parents,
and the economy, and yet America is deeply invested, as it were, in the market
model.102 Eichner thus uses the tools of institutional landscape, institutional
choice, and institutional design to identify and analyze the stark differences in
family-support policies, and she uses institutional friction to anticipate the
challenge of reorienting the United States, given our strong market
commitments.
As a professor of both law and sociology, Catherine Albiston likewise
fruitfully deploys institutional analysis to contribute to this debate. Albiston has
written extensively about family leave laws and policies, illuminating the role
of institutions.103 Albiston contends that laws such as the Family and Medical
Leave Act cannot easily resolve the conflict between the demands of work and
caregiving because these laws run headlong into the economic and social
institutions of work, gender, and family.104 Albiston uses sociological research
100

See EICHNER, supra note 5, at 69-91; Maxine Eichner, The Privatized American Family,
93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 213, 220-59 (2017).
101
See EICHNER, supra note 5, at 19-42, 220-21 (discussing work of Danish sociologist
Gøsta Esping-Andersen); id. at 38-52, 95, 107-13 (describing how United States falls far
behind other wealthy countries in supporting caregiving and paid labor, with absence of
policies such as guaranteed paid parental leave, universal child allowances, and widely
available subsidized childcare).
102
See id. at 20-42, 47-48, 206-07, 220-21.
103
See, e.g., ALBISTON, supra note 19, at 25-68 (developing account of relationship
between family leave laws and their institutional context); Catherine R. Albiston, Bargaining
in the Shadow of Social Institutions: Competing Discourses and Social Change in Workplace
Mobilization of Civil Rights, 39 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 11, 11, 22-40 (2005) (reporting results of
study on family leave, which found that social institutions influenced decision to take—and
often not take—family leave, and focusing particularly on “institutionalized conceptions of
work, gender, and disability that shape workers’ perceptions, preferences, and choices about
mobilizing their rights”); Catherine Albiston & Lindsey Trimble O’Connor, Just Leave, 39
HARV. J.L. & GENDER 1, 6, 40-47 (2016) (arguing “institutional and cultural factors” influence
decisions of low-wage workers not to take family leave to which they are legally entitled).
104
See Catherine Albiston, Institutional Perspectives on Law, Work, and Family, 3 ANN.
REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 397, 398 (2007) [hereinafter Albiston, Institutional Perspectives].
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to show that these institutions are socially constructed but perceived as natural
by their participants. Thus, individual players typically do not question social
practices, such as the idea that men are breadwinners and women are caregivers
or that the workplace requires undivided loyalty.105 As Albiston explains, the
law cannot easily change these institutions, and thus any policy must account for
the resistance within existing institutions.106 Adding this analysis of institutional
design and institutional friction to debates about family leave policies
demonstrates that identifying the “right” policy is necessary but not nearly
sufficient to resolve the conflict between work and caregiving.
Finally, Katharine Silbaugh uses an institutional lens to identify the multiple
ways the state exacerbates the conflict between paid labor and caregiving. In a
series of articles, Silbaugh has analyzed the impact of urban design on families,
underscoring that urban sprawl is deeply influenced by institutional
arrangements, including racism, car culture, single-family homes, and
educational systems, with distinct government policies that create and reinforce
these social patterns.107 Silbaugh argues that proposals to address the tension
between work and family cannot easily overcome these institutional
arrangements, which channel family life into specific—and often untenable—
residential patterns.108 Like Eichner and Albiston, Silbaugh places institutional
analysis at the center of the argument, using the methodology to identify relevant
institutions, analyze their design, and pinpoint institutional friction.

105
See ALBISTON, supra note 19, at 27-28; Albiston, Institutional Perspectives, supra note
104, at 401-12.
106
Albiston, Institutional Perspectives, supra note 104, at 399-401, 408-19.
107
See Katharine B. Silbaugh, Sprawl, Family Rhythms, and the Four-Day Work Week, 42
CONN. L. REV. 1267, 1270-74 (2010) [hereinafter Silbaugh, Sprawl]; Katharine B. Silbaugh,
Women’s Place: Urban Planning, Housing Design, and Work-Family Balance, 76 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1797, 1818-19, 1836-39, 1842-52 (2007) [hereinafter Silbaugh, Women’s Place].
108
See Silbaugh, Sprawl, supra note 107, at 1270. In other work, Silbaugh also casts in
institutional terms the debate about whether and how the government should assume
responsibility for care work. See Katharine B. Silbaugh, Foreword: The Structures of Care
Work, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1389, 1391-1401 (2001); see also Katharine Silbaugh, The Legal
Design for Parenting Concussion Risk, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 197, 201-05, 232-55 (2019)
(assessing legislation to manage sports-related concussion risk among minors and arguing
that it places most decision-making risk on parents, consistent with larger policy trend of
shifting risk from institutions—and thus society more broadly—to individuals, and that this
risk shifting is inconsistent with legal framework for parental decision-making); Katharine B.
Silbaugh, The Practice of Marriage, 20 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 189, 208-11, 214-16 (2005)
[hereinafter Silbaugh, The Practice of Marriage] (analyzing marriage as legal and social
institution); Katharine B. Silbaugh, Marriage Contracts and the Family Economy, 93 NW. U.
L. REV. 65, 70 (1998) (analyzing premarital agreements, assessing whether “individuals [can]
create their own definition of” marriage, and arguing that “without social boundaries to the
stock of available meanings [of marriage,] the individual meanings would be merely private
and unrecognizable; the opposite of an institution”).
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In sum, the few scholars who engage in explicit institutional analysis illustrate
the potential of foregrounding institutional considerations and drawing on the
robust literature from other disciplines.109
*****
It is unclear why family law scholars generally do not embrace
institutionalism. Perhaps it is because family law simply implicates too many
institutions.110 Individual cases can involve numerous legal institutions,
including courts, mediation, expert witnesses, different kinds of lawyers and
advisers, including guardians ad litem and court-appointed special advocates,
and so on. Entrenched social institutions, from racism to patriarchy, deeply
influence family law’s rules.111 And economic institutions, from markets to the
family wage, play a role in legal regulation.112 Beyond this institutional array,
every state has its own laws, and family law practice varies by county,
courthouse, city, and even judge.113 In short, family law might be overwhelmed
by the problem of variety and has not seen the institutional forest for the trees.
Indeed, as Part II shows, it is remarkably challenging—but not impossible—to
map family law’s institutions.
The problem might also be that intimacy and close personal relationships lie
at the heart of family law, and scholars thus focus on individuals and affective
ties rather than the institutions that influence intimacy.114 Moreover, family law
doctrine emphasizes rights of individuals: a parent has a right to the care and

109
There are a few other examples of the small universe of family law scholars directly
engaging with explicit institutional analyses. See, e.g., Anne L. Alstott, Tax Policy and
Feminism: Competing Goals and Institutional Choices, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 2001, 2005 (1996)
(arguing tax policy can address some concerns of feminists about work, family, and
entrenched gender roles but contending this requires explicit analysis of institutional choice);
Nancy J. Knauer, The Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships: Comparative Institutional
Analysis, Contested Social Goals, and Strategic Institutional Choice, 28 U. HAW. L. REV. 23,
24 (2005) (arguing for use of modified comparative institutional choice analysis in context of
contested social goals).
110
I thank Emily Stolzenberg for this theory. See Stolzenberg, supra note 1, at 2051-52.
111
See infra text accompanying notes 161-63.
112
See infra text accompanying notes 150-57.
113
See Sean Hannon Williams, Wild Flowers in the Swamp: Local Rules and Family Law,
65 DRAKE L. REV. 781, 790-97 (2017) (noting this variety and its problems); Sean Hannon
Williams, Sex in the City, 43 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1107, 1108-12 (2016) (arguing family law’s
standard-based approach to regulation delegates tremendous authority to local family court
judges).
114
I thank Katharine Silbaugh for this insight. See generally Silbaugh, The Practice of
Marriage, supra note 108 (discussing marriage as a legal and social institution). But see
Elizabeth F. Emens, Intimate Discrimination: The State’s Role in the Accidents of Sex and
Love, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1307, 1367-73 (2009) (describing role of state in shaping romantic
preferences and opportunities).
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custody of a child,115 a woman has a right to terminate a pregnancy,116 and an
individual has a right to marry someone of the same sex.117 These individual
rights reflect narratives of heroic individuals rather than the relational aspects of
life.118 And individualism in family law distracts from understanding how
institutional arrangements deeply affect family relationships, both shaping
preferences and channeling behavior.119 This, too, is a barrier that legal scholars
can overcome, and an understanding of institutional arrangements can—and
should—be at the fore.
Whatever the reason for the lacuna, there is no compelling reason for family
law exceptionalism in institutional analysis. The remainder of this Article
accordingly seeks to encourage more institutionalist scholarship, beginning the
project of systematically and holistically integrating institutional analysis into
family law.
II.

IDENTIFYING FAMILY LAW’S INSTITUTIONS

Identifying the institutions that shape family law is the first step in making
institutionalism more central to the field. This descriptive foundation—itself a
contribution to the literature—makes it possible to analyze institutional choice,
institutional design, and institutional friction.120 Any descriptive account,
however, must address two definitional questions: the boundaries of family law
and the boundaries of the relevant institutions. Both are potentially very broad,
which risks dulling the analysis. The field of family law arguably includes all
aspects of legal regulation that influence intimate relationships and family
functioning, from criminal law to tax policy.121 And an array of political,

115

See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 534
(1925) (recognizing parent’s right to make educational decisions for their child); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923) (endorsing “the power of parents to control the education
of their [children]”).
116
See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992) (upholding
woman’s right to terminate a pregnancy and adopting “undue burden” test).
117
See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 665 (2015) (asserting analysis of past
precedent “compels the conclusion that same-sex couples may exercise the right to marry”).
118
See JENNIFER NEDELSKY, LAW’S RELATIONS: A RELATIONAL THEORY OF SELF,
AUTONOMY, AND LAW 19-38 (2011) (arguing for relational understanding of rights); see also
Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities, 1 YALE J.L.
& FEMINISM 7, 12 (1989) (describing “deeply ingrained sense that individual autonomy is to
be achieved by erecting a wall (of rights) between the individual and those around him”).
119
See supra note 98 (describing work of Carl Schneider).
120
As Part III illustrates, in any given institutional analysis, the map of institutions will
expand or contract.
121
As Maxine Eichner has characterized this conception of family law, “[f]ueled by the
recognition that families are social institutions profoundly affected by their social and
economic contexts, and that an increasing range of families are being destabilized by these
contexts, the emerging scholarship of the 2010s situates families, including nontraditional
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economic, and social institutions, from foster care to family dinners, are relevant
to family law.122 Further complicating the inquiry, family law and some
institutions can be mutually constitutive, with each influencing the other in ways
that are often difficult to disentangle.123 But if all law is family law, and
everything is an institution, deploying institutionalism is both an impossible
task, and the methodology risks losing its distinctive contribution.
To address this problem, this Part puts some reasonable boundaries around
the definition of family law. Loosely tracking Carl Schneider’s iconic taxonomy
of family law, this Part identifies three main domains of family law: the
substantive rules that regulate family behavior, dispute-resolution systems, and
the provision of material resources and services needed by families.124 This
relatively narrow definition of family law keeps the focus on methodology in
this agenda-setting Article.

families, within their surrounding world.” Maxine Eichner, The Family, in Context, 128
HARV. L. REV. 1980, 1981-82 (2015) (footnote omitted) (reviewing books written by June
Carbone and Naomi Cahn, Jill Elaine Hasday, and Clare Huntington). Scholars thus contend
that criminal law is family law, see, e.g., Elizabeth D. Katz, Criminal Law in a Civil Guise:
The Evolution of Family Courts and Support Laws, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 1241, 1245 (2019);
Melissa Murray, Strange Bedfellows: Criminal Law, Family Law, and the Legal Construction
of Intimate Life, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1253, 1256 (2009); that racial segregation laws and their
ongoing effects are family law, see, e.g., Lenhardt, supra note 8, at 2076; and that zoning law
is family law, see, e.g., Silbaugh, Women’s Place, supra note 107, at 1848-50. I, too, have
argued that family law reaches across many areas of the law. See CLARE HUNTINGTON,
FAILURE TO FLOURISH: HOW LAW UNDERMINES FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS 55-80 (2014). For one
approach to the definitional question, see Kerry Abrams, Family History: Inside and Out, 111
MICH. L. REV. 1001, 1003-05 (2013), which distinguishes family law, traditionally defined as
marriage, divorce, and related issues such as parentage, from “the law of the family,” which
includes “the many ways in which families are created, shaped, and constrained by law,”
including tax law, contract law, property law, welfare law, criminal law, tort law, and so on.
122
See supra text accompanying notes 110-13.
123
See Silbaugh, The Practice of Marriage, supra note 108.
124
In Schneider’s taxonomy, family law has five functions: (1) protecting citizens from
harm by other citizens, especially harm from parents and spouses; (2) helping people organize
their lives as they wish by giving effect to contracts about private affairs; (3) resolving
disputes within the family, especially at the end of relationships; (4) expressing society’s
views about desirable behavior; and (5) channeling people into social institutions that are
widely believed to further desired ends, notably marriage and parenthood. See Schneider,
supra note 98, at 497-98. Since Schneider identified these functions, family law scholars now
regularly add a sixth function: public provisioning for a family’s needs. See, e.g., MAXINE
EICHNER, THE SUPPORTIVE STATE: FAMILIES, GOVERNMENT, AND AMERICA’S POLITICAL
IDEALS 8-10 (2010) (arguing why the state, consistent with a theory of liberal democracy,
should proactively support families); see also Eichner, supra note 96, at 459-61 (describing
scholars who argue for greater state support of all families, especially low-income families).
This Article thus draws on these functional accounts but, for the sake of parsimony, simplifies
family law into the three categories described in the text. The important aspects of expressing
society’s views and channeling individuals into desirable social institutions is an intrinsic part
of the three categories used in the text.
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When it comes to identifying relevant institutions, the goal is to demonstrate
that families are embedded in a web of legal and nonlegal institutions that restrict
and enable family life. Indeed, it is illuminating simply to identify this broad
range of state, nonstate, political, social, and economic institutions. But because
a far-reaching account risks watering down the analysis, this Part identifies
categories of institutions and focuses on the most salient, reaching broadly but
not including every possible institution. This Part also identifies areas of
particularly strong mutual constitution, underscoring, for example, the coconstruction of family law and racism, classism, and patriarchy. Finally, as this
Part demonstrates, many institutions play a role in multiple domains of family
law, and highlighting this overlap is part of the exercise, showing the dominant
role of some institutions.
As noted in the Introduction and Part I, this Article relies on the widely
accepted definition of an institution as “the humanly devised constraints that
shape human interaction”125 as well as the understanding that an institution must
possess normative, regulative, and cognitive components.126 Take family court,
for example. As a normative matter, the institution of family court tells each
party how they should act, such as expectations that litigants should present
legal, not emotional, arguments that address justiciable issues, and that judges
should display proper judicial comportment and decide issues based on the
law.127 As a regulative matter, family court monitors this behavior through
substantive and procedural rules. And as a cognitive matter, family court is a
widely understood shorthand for judicial resolution of issues such as divorce,
adoption, parentage, and child maltreatment.128 This Part does not repeat this
exercise for each institution, but the definition limits the categories of
institutions that are included.
A.

Substantive Rules

Substantive rules are at the heart of family law. Some rules directly regulate
families, such as determining legal parentage and prohibiting violence.129 Some
rules indirectly regulate families by providing incentives or subsidies, such as
125
See supra text accompanying notes 18, 69. This Part sometimes elides the distinction
between an institution and an organization, embracing the institutionalists who argue that a
strict demarcation is not necessary. See supra text accompanying notes 76-80. Thus, this Part
typically identifies an institution (such as professional associations) and then discusses
examples of specific organizations (such as the American Bar Association).
126
See supra text accompanying notes 72-75 (describing this definition and these three
parts of an institution).
127
See, e.g., N.Y.C. BAR, INTRODUCTORY GUIDE TO THE NEW YORK CITY FAMILY COURT
1-39 (2006) (providing information to help families navigate family court); Terry A.
Maroney, Emotional Regulation and Judicial Behavior, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1485, 1500 (2011)
(describing anecdotal accounts of emotional impact of family cases on judges).
128
See N.Y.C. BAR, supra note 127, at 1-39.
129
See, e.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017); UNIF. INTERSTATE ENF’T OF
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PROT. ORDERS ACT (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2002).
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childcare subsidies that encourage parents to work outside the home.130 And
some rules constitute the choice architecture of family life,131 such as the default
rules on property distribution following a divorce.132 As this Section describes,
numerous institutions play a role in making and influencing these substantive
rules, and sometimes the law and institutions are mutually constitutive.
1. Institutions that Make Rules
Unsurprisingly, state institutions play an outsized—but not monopolizing—
role in establishing and reforming substantive rules. The legislature writes laws;
courts interpret these laws and constitutions, and, to a lesser degree, establish
substantive rules through the common law; and the administrative state
interprets statutes and passes regulations when implementing legislative
directives and programs.
Beyond the state, communities supply the norms for some of family law’s
standards-based approach to legal regulation. The rules governing corporal
punishment and child neglect illustrate this role for communities. Every state in
the country privileges a parent’s use of “reasonable” corporal punishment,133 and
this inquiry looks to the community to determine what is reasonable. As norms
of parenting and acceptable discipline change over time, what is reasonable, and
thus legally privileged, is shrinking considerably. A century ago, it was perfectly
reasonable to hit a child with a belt; today, much less so.134 Similarly, the
standard used to determine physical child neglect asks whether “a parent,
guardian, or custodian inflicts serious physical harm on a child . . . in a manner
that substantially deviates from the standard of care exercised by a reasonable
parent.”135 As with the corporal punishment standard, this inquiry looks to the
community to determine what is reasonable and what constitutes the standard of

130
See OCC Fact Sheet, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
https://www.acf.hhs.gov/occ/fact-sheet [https://perma.cc/R26P-L3LJ] (last updated June 23,
2021) (describing federal funding for child care subsidies, most notably the Child Care and
Development Fund, which “is the primary federal funding source for child care subsidies to
help eligible low-income working families access child care and to improve the quality of
child care for all children”).
131
See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 3 (2008).
132
See HUNTINGTON, supra note 121, at 55-80 (describing three categories of these
substantive rules: direct regulation, indirect regulation, and choice architecture).
133
RESTATEMENT OF CHILD. & THE L. § 3.24(a), (b) & cmt. a (AM. L. INST., Tentative Draft
No. 1, 2018) (explaining parental privilege in criminal and civil law).
134
Id. § 3.24(a), (b) & cmts. e & f. In a process that is difficult to disentangle, both courts
and communities determine what is reasonable: To the extent a parent uses a form or degree
of corporal punishment that is at odds with the norm in the community, this would be a factor
in the reasonableness inquiry. Id. § 3.24 cmt. d. And to the extent a court determines certain
conduct is unreasonable, this will likely influence behavior in the community. Either way, the
community plays a direct and key role in determining the bounds of reasonableness.
135
Id. § 3.20(b)(1).
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care. These standards change over time, and they are not particularly granular,
but the basic idea holds that the community, rather than the state, provides the
content of the legal standard.
2.

Institutions that Influence Rules

Although they do not enact laws or set relevant standards, many nonstate
institutions influence family law’s substantive rules.136 Professional associations
are well-entrenched in the American political economy and can have a profound
impact on substantive rules. Consider some specific organizations: The Uniform
Law Commission produced draft legislation in 1973 on no-fault divorce, and
nearly every state quickly adopted it.137 The American Psychiatric Association
classified and then declassified homosexuality as a mental illness, first
contributing to the stigmatization of gay and lesbian people and then speeding
the recognition of LGBTQ rights.138 In 2002, the American Law Institute
published the Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution,139 which reflected
and reinforced many of the existing divorce law trends in the states.140 And the
136
Some of these institutions can be considered hybrid state-nonstate institutions.
Academia is comprised of both private and public institutions, and professional associations
often receive state funding and can be heavily influenced by the state, such as state
governments appointing the members of the Uniform Law Commission. See About Us, UNIF.
L. COMM’N, https://www.uniformlaws.org/aboutulc/overview [https://perma.cc/LZ65-FR59]
(last visited Feb. 4, 2022).
137
See MODEL MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT (UNIF. L. COMM’N 1973); HERBERT JACOB,
SILENT REVOLUTION: THE TRANSFORMATION OF DIVORCE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 62-80
(1988) (describing history of no-fault divorce laws and pivotal role of Uniform Law
Commission). More recently, the Uniform Law Commission wrote the influential Uniform
Parentage Act of 2017, which states are beginning to adopt. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (UNIF. L.
COMM’N 2017).
138
Compare AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL MANUAL: MENTAL
DISORDERS 38-39 (1952) (listing homosexuality as “sexual deviation” within the broader
category of mental disorders), with Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Position Statement on
Homosexuality and Civil Rights, 131 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 497, 497 (1974) (stating
“homosexuality per se implies no impairment in judgment, stability, reliability, or general
social or vocational capabilities,” and therefore “deplor[ing] all public and private
discrimination against homosexuals” and “urg[ing] the enactment of civil rights legislation”).
For a discussion of how the American Psychiatric Association influenced the modern gay
rights movement and helped create greater acceptance of lesbian and gay individuals, see Jack
Drescher, The Removal of Homosexuality from the DSM: Its Impact on Today’s Marriage
Equality Debate, 16 J. GAY & LESBIAN MENTAL HEALTH 124, 129 (2012). The American
Psychiatric Association’s declassification was cited by the Supreme Court when it struck
down state laws limiting marriage to different-sex couples. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576
U.S. 644, 661 (2015).
139
PRINCIPLES OF THE L. OF FAM. DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDATIONS xv-xvi
(AM. L. INST. 2002) (consolidating and prompting state-level reforms to the rules of child
custody, child support, the distribution of marital property, and spousal maintenance).
140
Bartlett, supra note 6, at 34-35 (describing this reinforcement, such as move away from
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American Legislative Exchange Council141 produces draft statutes, such as the
Free Range Parenting Act, which are debated and adopted by state
legislatures.142
Religious entities lobby legislators and influence legislation through other
means. In the 1970s, Christian Science groups persuaded state legislatures to
enact religious accommodation statutes that protect parents from findings of
medical neglect when they decline medical treatment for their children on
religious grounds.143 And in New York State, the Catholic Church has heavily
influenced legislation, resisting the adoption of no-fault divorce until it was
finally enacted in 2010, decades after most states.144
The media may be a rapidly changing institution, with evolving rules of the
game, but it can have a powerful, if also indirect, influence on substantive rules.
Media—entertainment and news, traditional and social—shapes familial social
norms, which provide the backdrop for family law’s substantive rules.145
Content codes from the film industry in Hollywood prohibited the depiction of
interracial couples through the 1960s, perpetuating the norm of racial

terminology of custody and visitation). The American Law Institute (“ALI”) is currently
developing the first family law restatement, Restatement of Law, Children and the Law, which
will address the legal rules governing children in families, schools, the juvenile justice system,
and as emerging adults. See Children and the Law, ALI ADVISER,
http://www.thealiadviser.org/children-law/ [https://perma.cc/BP4M-N6HT] (last visited Feb.
4, 2022). Disclosure: I am an associate reporter for the restatement.
141
American Legislative Exchange Council (“ALEC”) is a group of state legislators and
interested parties “dedicated to the principles of limited government, free markets and
federalism.” See About ALEC, AM. LEGIS. EXCH. COUNCIL, https://www.alec.org/about/
[https://perma.cc/HFF7-SDLW] (last visited Feb. 4, 2022).
142
This draft legislation protects parents from allegations of neglect if they choose to give
their children limited independence to do activities such as playing outside, bicycling, and
walking to school. See Free Range Parenting Act, AM. LEGIS. EXCH. COUNCIL,
https://www.alec.org/model-policy/free-range-parenting-act/ [https://perma.cc/3A43-DDPN]
(last visited Feb. 4, 2022).
143
See Allison Ciullo, Note, Prosecution Without Persecution: The Inability of Courts to
Recognize Christian Science Spiritual Healing and a Shift Towards Legislative Action, 42
NEW ENG. L. REV. 155, 169-74 (2007).
144
See, e.g., J. Herbie DiFonzo & Ruth C. Stern, Addicted to Fault: Why Divorce Reform
Has Lagged in New York, 27 PACE L. REV. 559, 569-70, 589 (2007) (discussing Catholic
Church’s influence over divorce reform in New York); see also N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170(7)
(McKinney 2021); Meaghan E. Howard, Note, Modern Reformation: An Overview of New
York’s Domestic Relations Law Overhaul, 29 TOURO L. REV. 389, 390-91 (2013) (“New York
was the final state to adopt the no-fault system . . . .”).
145
For a discussion of the mutually constitutive relationship between social norms and
family law’s rules, and the scholarship exploring that relationship, see Clare Huntington,
Familial Norms and Normality, 59 EMORY L.J. 1103, 1127-32 (2010). For a discussion of
social media and its pervasive presence in family life, generating and perpetuating familial
norms, see Clare Huntington, Staging the Family, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589, 609-16 (2013).
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homogamy within families.146 More positively, many LGBTQ+ advocates credit
the TV show Will & Grace with introducing the American public to positive, if
also stereotypical, images of a gay man.147 The Brady Bunch, which aired from
1969 to 1974, normalized blended families.148 And black-ish, which debuted in
2014, places race center stage in family life, telling positive and race-conscious
stories about Black families.149
Economic institutions, such as private employers and insurance markets, also
influence family law’s substantive rules.150 In 1992, long before legislatures and
courts started recognizing marriage equality, private employers began offering
benefits for domestic partners.151 By 2015, the year the Supreme Court decided
Obergefell v. Hodges,152 62% of all large employers offered such benefits,153
contributing to the expectation that same-sex relationships are entitled to equal
respect and support. And economic institutions can blunt, if not thwart, family
law reforms, as illustrated by insurance markets. At common law, coverture—
146

See Kevin Noble Maillard, Hollywood Loving, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2647, 2651-54
(2018).
147
See Will & Grace (NBC); Stacey L. Sobel, Culture Shifting at Warp Speed: How the
Law, Public Engagement, and Will & Grace Led to Social Change for LGBT People, 89 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 143, 179 (2015); Dahlia Lithwick, Extreme Makeover: The Story Behind the
Story of Lawrence v. Texas, NEW YORKER, Mar. 12, 2012, at 76 (noting Will and Grace theory
as “most commonly accepted account” explaining shift in public opinion favoring gay
marriage).
148
See The Brady Bunch (ABC).
149
See black-ish (ABC); Tonya Pendleton, ‘black-ish’ Creator Kenya Barris Talks ‘The
Cosby Show’ Comparisons, BLACKAMERICAWEB.COM, https://blackamericaweb.com/2014
/11/19/blackish-creator-kenya-barris-talks-the-cosby-show-comparisons/ [https://perma.cc
/YBW8-7G58] (last visited Feb. 4, 2022).
150
Economic institutions can be categorized at both a high level of generality, such as
competitive markets and the banking system, see Henry Hazlitt, The Five Institutions of the
Market Economy, FOUND. FOR ECON. EDUC. (Nov. 25, 2016), https://fee.org/articles/the-fiveinstitutions-of-the-market-economy/ [https://perma.cc/U23M-XHVU] (describing “basic
institutions of the market economy” as “(1) private property, (2) free markets,
(3) competition, (4) division and combination of labor, and (5) social cooperation”), and a
high level of specificity, such as a child’s allowance and tipping, see Economic Institutions,
LIBR. OF ECON. & LIBERTY, https://www.econlib.org/library/Topics/HighSchool
/EconomicInstitutions.html [https://perma.cc/9PWU-PLNT] (last visited Feb. 4, 2022)
(providing examples of these and other economic institutions). For a broader description of
how the market has a pervasive influence on family functioning, see EICHNER, supra note 5,
at 69-91.
151
Reflecting on the Legacy of LS&Co.’s Domestic Partner Benefits, LEVI STRAUSS & CO.:
UNZIPPED
BLOG
(June
28,
2019),
https://www.levistrauss.com/2019/06/28
/partner_benefits/ [https://perma.cc/XRA2-3BEF] (“In June of 1992, Levi Strauss & Co.
became the first Fortune 500 company to offer domestic partner benefits, recognizing that the
wellbeing of our employees and their loved ones transcends sexual orientation or marital
status.”).
152
576 U.S. 644 (2015).
153
JIM GREGWARE, MERCER’S NATIONAL SURVEY OF EMPLOYER-SPONSORED HEALTH
PLANS 13 (2016).
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the legal unity of spouses—meant that one spouse could not sue the other in
tort.154 Even after coverture was abolished, the doctrine of spousal immunity
endured.155 To overcome this barrier, states largely abrogated the spousal
immunity,156 but private insurance companies now add exclusionary clauses to
policies, precluding recovery for a claim of one spouse against another.157
Finally, academic research influences family law. Extensive research on
same-sex parenting played a key role in marriage equality litigation, convincing
courts to strike down state restrictions.158 Less robust and ultimately disproved
research showing that mandatory arrest for perpetrators of domestic violence
helps reduce recidivism was a central factor in persuading states and localities
to adopt mandatory-arrest policies.159 Academic research can also work in
tandem with other institutions. A partnership between the media and academic
researchers, for example, can convert technical research into accessible language
and convincing policy frames. To convince policymakers, legislators, and the
public of the importance of early childhood development, neuroscientists
worked with media consultants to translate research into accessible language,
introducing terms such as “brain architecture” and “toxic stress,” which are now
thoroughly integrated into family law.160

154

See, e.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611, 614-15 (1910).
Suzanne A. Kim, Reconstructing Family Privacy, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 557, 573 (2006)
(“Spousal immunity for intentional torts persists in some form in several states as recently as
1996.”).
156
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895F(1) (AM. L. INST. 1979) (“A husband or
wife is not immune from tort liability to the other solely by reason of that relationship.”).
157
STUART M. SPEISER, CHARLES F. KRAUSE & ALFRED W. GANS, AMERICAN LAW OF
TORTS § 6:45 (Monique C.M. Leahy ed., 2021), Westlaw AMLOT. Some courts have upheld
these clauses and some have not. See id.
158
Academic research contributed significantly to the marriage equality movement. See
Huntington, Empirical Turn, supra note 8, at 241-50 (describing how this research played
central role throughout litigation, including in two of three cases that made it to Supreme
Court, which sought review of trial court decisions that developed rich factual records using
empirical evidence, notably work by sociologists, economists, and family studies scholars).
159
See Brinig, supra note 8, 1083-84 (describing this research and its influence but also
noting that this research was partially misleading because reduction in recidivism rate held
true only for employed men embedded in their communities). Despite the disproven research,
many jurisdictions still retain a mandatory-arrest policy. See id. at 1096. In family court, too
often, judges admit unreliable research, such as the unscientific study of so-called parental
alienation syndrome. See Huntington, Empirical Turn, supra note 8, at 256-57 (describing
widespread practice of family courts not applying Daubert standard and thus admitting
unreliable research).
160
See Key Concepts, CTR. ON DEVELOPING CHILD, https://developingchild.harvard.edu
/science/key-concepts/ [https://perma.cc/W9Q9-5T7D] (last visited Feb. 4, 2022); see also
Yael Cannon & Andrew Hsi, Disrupting the Path from Childhood Trauma to Juvenile Justice:
An Upstream Health and Justice Approach, 43 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 425, 440-45 (2016)
(describing toxic stress and its impact on early childhood development and child’s lifelong
health).
155
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3. Mutual Constitution
Some institutions and legal rules are mutually constitutive, including the
social institutions of racism and patriarchy. Consider race: As Robin Lenhardt
argues, antimiscegenation laws, with the central goal of preserving whiteness,
reflected and further entrenched a widespread belief in a racial hierarchy.161 In
turn, these laws underscored which families are desirable: monoracial, white
families.162 As with race, family law long reflected and reinforced patriarchy.
Legal rules such as coverture and the nonrecognition of marital rape granted
husbands tremendous power over their wives, supporting and furthering the
belief that this state of affairs was natural and justified because of the purported
inherent weakness of women.163
Familial roles—such as spouses, parents and children, and grandparents—are
institutions, and they too have a mutually constitutive relationship with the
law.164 When the Supreme Court recognized parental rights as part of the liberty
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court both drew on and
buttressed the institution of parents, reinforcing it as a foundational relationship
in the family.165 But mutual constitution can work in the other direction, too,
with family law undermining institutionalization. Othermothers, for example,
are an institution in the African American community,166 but family law
typically does not recognize these parent-like relationships, treating
othermothers as legal strangers to the child.167
161
R.A. Lenhardt, According to Our Hearts and Location: Toward a Structuralist
Approach to the Study of Interracial Families, 16 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 741, 742-43 (2013)
[hereinafter Lenhardt, Hearts and Location]; see Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1967)
(describing history of antimiscegenation laws and their goal of preserving whiteness).
162
Lenhardt, Hearts and Location, supra note 161, at 742-43.
163
See Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A Legal History of Marital Rape, 88
CALIF. L. REV. 1373, 1387-92 (2000).
164
See Schneider, supra note 98, at 496-511; see also Pierre Bordieu, On the Family as a
Realized Category, 13 THEORY CULTURE & SOC’Y 19, 19 (1996) (arguing legal definition of
family “while seeming to describe social reality, in fact construct[s] it”); id. at 25 (describing
role of state in this institutionalization). Calling familial relationships institutions invites an
analysis of the mutually constitutive roles of social norms and the law in creating, reinforcing,
and changing these institutions. See Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, From Contract to
Status: Collaboration and the Evolution of Novel Family Relationships, 115 COLUM. L. REV.
293, 359-65 (2015) (discussing cohabitation, which includes broad range of social practices,
from casual cohabitation with limited commitments to long-term highly committed
cohabitation; further reflecting that law thus far has chosen not to confer significant legal
status on cohabitating couples, partly because of their nonuniformity).
165
See supra note 115 (citing foundational cases).
166
This term generally refers to the caregiving many women provide to nonbiological
children, which can range from emotional care, shelter, and meals, to a near-adoption-like
relationship. See PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT: KNOWLEDGE,
CONSCIOUSNESS, AND THE POLITICS OF EMPOWERMENT 173-200 (2d ed. 2000).
167
See Clare Huntington, Repairing Family Law, 57 DUKE L.J. 1245, 1248 (2008). I do
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*****
There are many other types of institutions that play a role in family law’s
substantive rules,168 but this description is sufficient to demonstrate that the
not want to overstate the point. Family law does recognize some close adult-child
relationships that do not neatly fit into the parent-child category. See Cynthia Godsoe,
Subsidized Guardianship: A New Permanency Option, CHILD.’S LEGAL RTS. J., Fall 2003, at
11, 12-13 (describing guardianship rules for children leaving foster care); Douglas NeJaime,
The Nature of Parenthood, 126 YALE L.J. 2260, 2367-69 (2017) (describing doctrine of de
facto parenthood, although noting that doctrine reflects ambivalence about institutionalizing
relationships outside parent-child norm, with some states conferring full rights on de facto
parents and other states falling far short). Similarly, the eligibility requirements for food
stamps count all household members who cook together as a family, reinforcing a broader
understanding of the family. See U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 538 (1973)
(striking down federal law denying food stamps to households of “unrelated persons”); 7
C.F.R. § 273.1 (2021) (defining “general household” in terms unrelated to familial relations).
This is not necessarily a progressive rule, however, because it means that the income from
any adult member of the household counts towards, and thus limits, eligibility. See id.
§ 273.10 (detailing method of determining benefits eligibility based on household income).
168
Consider three more categories of institutions. First, issue-advocacy groups are distinct
from professional associations, drawing on a broader membership and created for the specific
purpose of furthering an identified agenda. See CRAIG B. HOLMAN & LUKE P. MCLOUGHLIN,
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., BUYING TIME 2000: TELEVISION ADVERTISING IN THE 2000 FEDERAL
ELECTIONS 22, 23 (2000) (defining issue advocacy to include “communications by parties or
groups intended to further or to derail a political issue, legislative proposal, or public policy”).
These groups provide a means for citizens who wish to express their views collectively.
Working from different political perspectives, specific organizations seek to influence family
law’s substantive rules, primarily through legislative efforts, litigation, and the media. The
marriage equality movement is a well-known example, see John F. Kowal, The Improbable
Victory of Marriage Equality, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Sept. 29, 2015),
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/improbable-victory-marriageequality [https://perma.cc/R2UG-U6FD] (describing role of both liberal advocacy and impact
litigation groups, such as National Center for Lesbian Rights, Lambda Legal, and ACLU, as
well as conservative groups, such as Young Conservatives for Marriage), but there are many
others, such as the influence of fathers’ rights groups over alimony reform, see Deborah
Dinner, The Divorce Bargain: The Fathers’ Rights Movement and Family Inequalities, 102
VA. L. REV. 79, 110-11 (2016).
Second, think tanks are a powerful institution affecting family law, helping generate and
translate research for policymakers and the public. Think tanks are generally action oriented,
focused on analyzing and developing policy solutions and then promoting these solutions.
JAMES G. MCGANN, THINK TANKS & CIV. SOC’YS PROGRAM, UNIV. OF PA., 2019 GLOBAL GO
TO THINK TANK INDEX REPORT 13 (2020). The specific organizations come in many forms,
with different funding streams, but they are ubiquitous, with 1,872 think tanks in the United
States alone. Id. at 15. Through their research agendas and publications, these institutions can
shape the conversation and, particularly, the evidence base for public policy. See id. at 37.
Finally, foundations are highly influential, providing funds and direct assistance, usually to
state and local governments as well as nonprofit agencies. See DANIEL RADER, COUNCIL ON
FOUNDS., THE ESSENTIALS FOR COLLABORATION BETWEEN FOUNDATIONS AND GOVERNMENT
3 (2010). In a testament to the power of this kind of work, one critic has termed this kind of
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reach is broad and includes state and nonstate institutions, as well as political,
social, and economic institutions.
B.

Dispute-Resolution Systems

Dispute-resolution systems settle conflicts among family members and
between families and the state. These civil, criminal, and administrative
proceedings address issues including divorce and separation, family violence,
juvenile offenses, and status offenses. As with family law’s substantive rules,
multiple institutions play a role in these systems.
1.

Institutions that Resolve Disputes

The main state institution is, unsurprisingly, the judiciary, which includes
both courtroom dispute resolution and state-sponsored alternatives, such as
mandatory, court-based mediation for divorcing spouses and diversion programs
for juvenile offenders.169 The administrative state plays a lesser role in the
resolution of disputes, with the exception of child support: in many states,
administrative agencies establish and enforce awards of child support.170
Although legislatures no longer directly resolve disputes,171 they do determine
procedural rules, which can profoundly affect dispute resolution.172

work a “corrupt policy-research merger,” contending that foundations choose programs, such
as family preservation, that reflect the foundation’s values and then set out “not to test, but
instead to prove the programs’ efficacy” to persuade policymakers to adopt the preferred
program. See Elizabeth Bartholet, Thoughts on the Liberal Dilemma in Child Welfare Reform,
24 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 725, 725-27 (2016).
169
See, e.g., General Stages of the Family Court Process, NYC L. DEP’T: FAM. CT. DIV.,
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/familycourtdivision/juvenile-delinquency/general-stages-of-thefamily-court-process.page [https://perma.cc/9XTK-NR3Q] (last visited Feb. 4, 2022).
170
See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 19-6-26(a)(1) (2021) (“‘Child support order’ means a
judgment, decree, or order of a court or authorized administrative agency requiring the
payment of child support in periodic amounts or in a lump sum . . . .”); 305 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 5/10-11 (2021) (“In lieu of actions for court enforcement of support . . . , the Child and
Spouse Support Unit of the Illinois Department . . . may issue an administrative order
requiring the responsible relative to comply with the terms of the determination and notice of
support due . . . .”); IOWA CODE § 252C.2(3) (2021) (“The provision of child support
collection . . . creates a support debt due and owing to the individual or the individual’s child
or ward by the responsible person in the amount of a support obligation established by court
order or by the administrator. The administrator may establish a support debt in favor of the
individual or the individual’s child or ward and against the responsible person . . . .”).
171
See, e.g., DiFonzo & Stern, supra note 144, at 565; see also Simeon E. Baldwin,
Legislative Divorces and the Fourteenth Amendment, 27 HARV. L. REV. 699, 699 (1914)
(describing pre-Fourteenth Amendment practice of legislative divorce).
172
See, e.g., Nicholas E. Kahn, Josh Gupta-Kagan & Mary Eschelbach Hansen, The
Standard of Proof in the Substantiation of Child Abuse and Neglect, 14 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 333, 356-57 (2017) (reporting results of empirical study finding that burden of proof in
child-protection proceeding affects substantiation rates for underlying abuse or neglect).
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Some nonstate institutions play a role in resolving disputes. Private mediators,
for example, abound in the field of divorce, facilitating negotiation settlements
for divorcing and separating couples.173 Courts generally rubberstamp these
settlement agreements, which address everything from child custody to property
division.174 And in the child welfare context, communities can be decision
makers, at least in some processes. Family group conferencing, for example, is
part of the broader restorative justice movement; when properly implemented,
the process defers to the decisions of a family’s community about how best to
keep the child safe and address the issues underlying the abuse or neglect.175
Outside the state, religious entities also resolve familial disputes. For Jewish
families, the Beth Din has jurisdiction over divorce and related matters; for
Christian families, the Christian Conciliation Service offers both conciliation
counseling and, if couples choose to divorce, dispute resolution for property and
maintenance; and for Muslim families, Islamic courts adjudicate family law
disputes.176 The extent to which civil courts uphold these agreements varies, but
when couples do not seek civil enforcement or do not challenge the arbitration
agreement in civil court, the religiously arbitrated decision is the final
determination.177
2.

Institutions that Influence Participants

Multiple institutions influence the behavior and decisions of judges, lawyers,
litigants, and other participants in dispute-resolution processes. Beginning with
professional associations, the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court
Judges was a key player in reforming sentencing for juvenile offenders,
encouraging judges to order community-based treatment rather than
detention.178 The American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers requires its
members to prevent clients from using child custody as a bargaining chip in

173
See ANDREW I. SCHEPARD, CHILDREN, COURTS, AND CUSTODY: INTERDISCIPLINARY
MODELS FOR DIVORCING FAMILIES 50-67 (2004) (describing prevalence of private alternative
dispute resolution and mediation).
174
See id.
175
See Huntington, Rights Myopia, supra note 96, at 674-80 (describing process of family
group conferencing).
176
See MICHAEL J. BROYDE, SHARIA TRIBUNALS, RABBINICAL COURTS, AND CHRISTIAN
PANELS: RELIGIOUS ARBITRATION IN AMERICA AND THE WEST 14-21 (2017); Julia Halloran
McLaughlin, Taking Religion Out of Civil Divorce, 65 RUTGERS L. REV. 395, 421-26 (2013).
177
See, e.g., Jabri v. Qaddura, 108 S.W.3d 404, 413-14 (Tex. App. 2003) (upholding
agreement between two spouses that divorce would be arbitrated in Texas Islamic Court); see
also BROYDE, supra note 176, at 21-24 (describing requirements under Federal Arbitration
Act to ensure enforceability of religious arbitration agreements). But see Hirsch v. Hirsch,
774 N.Y.S.2d 48, 49-50 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) (refusing on public policy grounds to enforce
Beth Din award of child support, custody, and property).
178
See NAT’L COUNCIL OF JUV. & FAM. CT. JUDGES, ENHANCED JUVENILE JUSTICE
GUIDELINES: IMPROVING COURT PRACTICE IN JUVENILE JUSTICE CASES 27-28 (2018).
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financial negotiations or as a tool for expressing vindictiveness.179 And the
American Bar Association writes practice standards guiding the representation
of children, parents, and agencies in child welfare proceedings.180
Religious entities can influence the levers of dispute-resolution systems.
Hasidic Jews in Brooklyn, for example, long supported the district attorney
Charles Hynes,181 and, in return, there is evidence that Hynes did not actively
pursue credible allegations of child sexual abuse within the Hasidic
community.182 Religious entities also influence the behavior of family members
in dispute-resolution processes, including whether to engage in legal processes
at all, with some religious groups discouraging members from reporting intimate
partner violence and sexual abuse.183
With more diffuse effect, the media can influence the resolution of disputes.
Advocates know they need to win the media war as much as the legal battle.184
Attorneys choose plaintiffs who play into popular images of the family.185 And
during litigation, lawyers actively seek media coverage that is sympathetic to

179

AM. ACAD. OF MATRIM. LAWS., BOUNDS OF ADVOCACY: GOALS FOR FAMILY LAWYERS
§ 6.2 (2000). One requirement of membership is that an attorney agrees to abide by the
Academy’s “Bounds of Advocacy” which establish basic practice norms—although not
enforceable rules—for family law attorneys. Id. at preliminary statement.
180
See generally AM. BAR ASS’N, STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR LAWYERS WHO
REPRESENT CHILDREN IN ABUSE AND NEGLECT CASES (1996); AM. BAR ASS’N, STANDARDS OF
PRACTICE FOR ATTORNEYS REPRESENTING PARENTS IN ABUSE AND NEGLECT CASES (2006);
AM. BAR ASS’N, STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR LAWYERS REPRESENTING CHILD WELFARE
AGENCIES (2004); CHILD.’S JUST. PROJ., REPRESENTING PARENTS IN ABUSE AND NEGLECT
PROCEEDINGS: AN ADVOCACY AND TRAINING GUIDE FOR WYOMING PRACTITIONERS (2016)
(incorporating American Bar Association (“ABA”) standards into state practice).
181
Ray Rivera & Sharon Otterman, For Ultra-Orthodox in Abuse Cases, Prosecutor Has
Different Rules, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2012, at A25 (“Mr. Hynes has won election six times
as district attorney thanks in part to support from ultra-Orthodox rabbis, who lead growing
communities in neighborhoods like Borough Park and Crown Heights.”).
182
Rachel Aviv, The Outcast, NEW YORKER, Nov. 10, 2014, at 44; Rivera & Otterman,
supra note 181.
183
See, e.g., OFF. OF ATT’Y GEN., COMMONWEALTH OF PA., REPORT I OF THE 40TH
STATEWIDE INVESTIGATING GRAND JURY 3, 17, 67, 168, 326 (2018); Joshua Pease, The Sin of
Silence: The Epidemic of Denial About Sexual Abuse in the Evangelical Church, WASH. POST
(May 31, 2018), www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/wp/2018/05/31/feature/theepidemic-of-denial-about-sexual-abuse-in-the-evangelical-church/ (describing efforts of
some Evangelical churches to discourage reporting of sexual abuse within community); Aviv,
supra note 182 (describing sexual abuse in Hasidic community in Brooklyn and reporting
evidence of religious leaders telling parents and children not to report abuse).
184
See, e.g., Suzanne B. Goldberg, Multidimensional Advocacy as Applied: Marriage
Equality and Reproductive Rights, 29 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 4 (2015).
185
See Cynthia Godsoe, Perfect Plaintiffs, 125 YALE L.J.F. 136, 145-53 (2015) (describing
this practice in cause litigation).
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their version of the facts.186 These efforts are directed both at the decision maker
and the broader context for the decision.187
C.

Provision of Material Resources and Services

Access to material resources and services is essential for child and family
well-being. These include multiple needs, such as food, housing, health care,
and childcare, as well as services for disabled family members and those who
struggle with, for example, substance abuse disorder. As with the other domains
of family law, a variety of political, social, and economic institutions—state and
nonstate—play a role in the provision of resources and services.
1.

Institutions that Provide Resources and Services

Legislatures create the system of public provisioning, and the administrative
state implements it. Through the exercise of delegated power, federal agencies
oversee programs such as the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program,
subsidized housing, Medicaid and Medicare, and Head Start.188 The federal
administrative state typically sets the policies, and, depending on the state, either
state or local agencies administer the actual benefits, with considerable
discretion for state and local officials.189 To give one example of the power of
the administrative process, consider the Medicaid program. Shortly after coming
into office, the Trump Administration encouraged states to apply for waivers to
Medicaid’s statutory provisions.190 Subsequently, numerous states applied for,
and were granted, waivers allowing the states to require Medicaid recipients to
work.191

186
For example, in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 637 (2013), the adoptive
parents, who were seeking permanent custody of a Cherokee child they had fostered, actively
sought media coverage vilifying the biological father’s attempts to obtain custody pursuant to
the Indian Child Welfare Act. See, e.g., George Howell & Greg Botelho, Indian Family
Protection Law Central to Emotional Custody Battle, CNN (Jan. 8, 2012),
https://edition.cnn.com/2012/01/08/us/south-carolina-indian-adoption/
[https://perma.cc/2G53-DG9Y]; Megyn Kelly, Young Girl Taken by Biological Father 2
Years After Adoption, FOX NEWS (Jan. 11, 2012), https://www.video.foxnews.com
/v/1384028543001#sp=show-clips [https://perma.cc/8RPA-SE87].
187
See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 184, at 4.
188
Programs that Use the Poverty Guidelines as a Part of Eligibility Determination,
HHS.GOV, https://www.hhs.gov/answers/hhs-administrative/what-programs-use-the-poverty
-guidelines/index.html [https://perma.cc/YS8T-WSWU] (last updated Nov. 5, 2019).
189
See, e.g., Letter from Thomas E. Price, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., &
Seema Verma, Adm’r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., to Governor (Mar. 14, 2017),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/sec-price-admin-verma-ltr.pdf
[https://perma.cc/643Z-FFF4] (affirming partnership in improving Medicaid).
190
See id.
191
See Jen Fifield, Work Requirements for Medicaid Are Now OK in Four States, PEW
(May 9, 2018), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2018
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Through the system of public provisioning, the government offers some
goods and services directly to families, such as public education and food
stamps,192 but much public provisioning is accomplished through
privatization.193 Most housing subsidies, for example, are vouchers, which
enable recipients to obtain housing from private landlords; and most Medicaid
recipients go to a doctor who accepts Medicaid as a form of insurance rather
than a Medicaid clinic.194 Further, the government contracts directly with
nonprofits to provide services, such as drug treatment195 and early childhood
education.196 And many states have partially or wholly privatized the child

/05/09/work-requirements-for-medicaid-are-now-ok-in-four-states [https://perma.cc/Y9YU5TP8] (describing approvals for Arkansas, Indiana, Kentucky, and New Hampshire, as well
as numerous applications in pipeline for approval). For a history of Kentucky’s application
and approval, as well as the subsequent litigation finding the granting of the waiver arbitrary
and capricious, see Stewart v. Azar, 313 F. Supp. 3d 237, 243-48 (D.D.C. 2018).
192
See JANET M. CURRIE, THE INVISIBLE SAFETY NET: PROTECTING THE NATION’S POOR
CHILDREN AND FAMILIES 21-26, 61-90 (2006) (describing income support programs, including
the Earned Income Tax Credit and nutrition assistance).
193
Observing this privatization is not new. See, e.g., John J. DiIulio, Jr., Government by
Proxy: A Faithful Overview, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1271, 1272-73 (2003) (describing
privatization across multiple areas of government services); Matthew Diller, Form and
Substance in the Privatization of Poverty Programs, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1739, 1758 (2002)
(describing push toward privatizing poverty programs during the Bush Administration).
194
See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV., FISCAL YEAR 2020: BUDGET IN BRIEF 10
(2020) (explaining how U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development spent
approximately $22 billion on tenant-based rental assistance in 2019, which gives recipients
vouchers to obtain housing from private landlords, and approximately $7 billion on public
housing in 2019). Medicaid is a joint federal and state program that, together with the
Children’s Health Insurance Program, provides health coverage to over 72.5 million
Americans. Eligibility, MEDICAID.GOV, https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/eligibility
/index.html [https://perma.cc/MP2J-6SCS] (last visited Feb. 4, 2022); Cost Sharing,
MEDICAID.GOV,
https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/cost-sharing/index.html
[https://perma.cc/2YXW-STTW] (last visited Feb. 4, 2022) (describing payment structure
under Medicaid).
195
Behavioral Health Services, MEDICAID.GOV, https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid
/benefits/behavioral-health-services/index.html [https://perma.cc/SC8L-HFLN] (last visited
Feb. 4, 2022).
196
The Head Start program is the primary source of federal funding, and it awards grants
directly to public agencies, private nonprofit and for-profit organizations, tribal governments,
and school systems for operating Head Start programs in local communities. See U.S. Dep’t
of Health & Hum. Servs., Head Start Program Facts: Fiscal Year 2018, HEAD START
ECLKC, https://eclkc.ohs.acf.hhs.gov/about-us/article/head-start-program-facts-fiscal-year2018 [https://perma.cc/RB8S-VLZA] (last updated Dec. 31, 2019).
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welfare system,197 usually through nonprofit agencies but sometimes through
for-profit entities.198
Given this privatization, numerous nonstate institutions play a central role in
public provisioning, including religious entities, nonprofit agencies, and forprofit entities. Religious entities, for example, contract directly with the
government to provide housing and health care.199 Religious entities are
particularly active in the child welfare system, operating agencies that contract
with the government to provide services to children and families.200 States no
longer allow these entities to prioritize children of their own faith,201 but some
states have enacted religious exemptions that allow faith-based social service

197

See Susan Vivian Mangold, Challenging the Parent-Child-State Triangle in Public
Family Law: The Importance of Private Providers in the Dependency System, 47 BUFF. L.
REV. 1397, 1410-12, 1449-55 (1999) (describing prevalence of private agencies in child
welfare). In the child welfare system, states began to privatize in the 1990s, and by 2000,
twenty-nine states had established privatization initiatives. Allison Dunnigan, Does
Privatization Matter? An Exploration of Foster Care Permanency Outcomes 23-24 (May 15,
2018)
(Ph.D.
dissertation,
Washington
University
in
St.
Louis),
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2552&context=art_sci_etds
[https://perma.cc/8WMV-W9R3]. In Florida, the entire system is privatized. See Dunnigan,
supra, at 34 tbl.1. In these privatization schemes, private agencies provide services to families,
including casework, foster care, drug treatment, and much more. See id. at 34-35 tbl.1.
Privatization contracts are typically service-based or performance-based, and states choose to
prioritize or incentivize specific outcomes. See id. at 24.
198
See Mimi Kirk, Does Privatized Foster Care Put Kids at Risk?, BLOOMBERG CITYLAB
(June 15, 2018, 12:49 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-15/whymore-states-are-privatizing-foster-care (explaining how for-profit corporations, such as
MENTOR, contract to provide foster care services in growing number of states, and, even in
states that forbid for-profit entities from providing foster care, nonprofit agency subcontracts
with for-profit agency to provide services).
199
Federal law prohibits any government entity from discriminating against a religious
entity when contracting for services, thus faith-based organizations are eligible for service
contracts. See Stanley W. Carlson-Thies, Faith-Based Initiative 2.0: The Bush Faith-Based
and Community Initiative, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 931, 931-47 (2009); see, e.g., Our
Vision, CATHOLIC CHARITIES USA, https://www.catholiccharitiesusa.org/our-vision-andministry/ [https://perma.cc/9QJX-X4TJ] (last visited Feb. 4, 2022) (describing services,
including affordable housing, integrated healthcare, and others).
200
See Natalie Goodnow, The Role of Faith-Based Agencies in Child Welfare, HERITAGE
FOUND. (May 22, 2018), https://www.heritage.org/civil-society/report/the-role-faith-basedagencies-child-welfare [https://perma.cc/728B-K52R] (“In 2016 alone, Catholic Charities
agencies around the country served around 10,500 children through foster care and adoption
services.”).
201
See NINA BERNSTEIN, THE LOST CHILDREN OF WILDER: THE EPIC STRUGGLE TO CHANGE
FOSTER CARE 44-45 (2001) (describing decades-long legal challenge to practices of New York
City faith-based agencies, which were allowed to prioritize children based on their faith, and
case’s settlement, which prohibited this practice).
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agencies to decline to serve a population based on the agency’s religious
beliefs.202
Outside the state, communities support many families. This is especially true
for moderate- and low-income families, who often rely on their extended
networks for support, either in person or virtually through social media.203
Communities of color have a particularly strong history of providing for each
other, given the lack of government resources for these families.204
2.

Institutions that Influence Public Provisioning

Numerous institutions influence government decisions about public
provisioning, illustrated by examples of one economic and two social
institutions. As Maxine Eichner has argued and Part I summarized, the market—
and, more specifically, a commitment to the institution of the free market—is a
powerful economic institution that also has a profound impact on public
provisioning.205 Many wealthy countries, especially in northern Europe, assign
an active role for the state in public provisioning, ensuring that all families have
their basic needs met.206 These countries also assume there is a role for the state
202

See, e.g., Foster Care Nondiscrimination Act of 2003, CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§ 16001.9(a) (West 2021); Protecting Freedom of Conscience from Government
Discrimination Act, MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 11-62-3 to -7 (2022). Until recently, Philadelphia
did not have such an exemption and required all foster care agencies to serve all children and
families. In June 2021, the Supreme Court held that Philadelphia’s refusal to renew its foster
care contract with Catholic Social Services, unless it agreed to certify same-sex couples as
eligible foster parents, violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Fulton v.
City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1882 (2021). For an argument that religious exemptions
can significantly harm LGBTQ youth, see Jordan Blair Woods, Religious Exemptions and
LGBTQ Child Welfare, 103 MINN. L. REV. 2343, 2402-08 (2019), which describes these laws
and explains how they permit faith-based social service organizations to discriminate against
LGBTQ youth.
Another example of the impact of religion on public provisioning is the Affordable Care
Act’s requirement that for-profit employers offer health insurance that includes access to all
FDA-approved contraceptives; the Supreme Court struck down the contraception coverage
requirement as applied to a privately held company, concluding that it created a substantial
burden on the religious corporation by forcing it to violate its religious principles and that the
federal government had other means to ensure women had access to contraceptives. Burwell
v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 726-37 (2014).
203
See,
e.g.,
Get
Help
with
Medical
Fundraising,
GOFUNDME,
https://www.gofundme.com/start/medical-fundraising [https://perma.cc/7Q2N-66G5] (last
visited Feb. 4, 2022) (reassuring users that such campaigns are widely used and accepted).
204
See generally CAROL B. STACK, ALL OUR KIN: STRATEGIES FOR SURVIVAL IN A BLACK
COMMUNITY (1974) (providing classic account of this kind of reliance); KATHRYN J. EDIN &
H. LUKE SHAEFER, $2.00 A DAY: LIVING ON ALMOST NOTHING IN AMERICA (2015) (describing
modern systems of support, which are frayed for many families but can be stronger within
communities of color).
205
See EICHNER, supra note 5, at 19-42.
206
See id. at 19-28 (discussing several countries policies’ and emphasizing that Finland’s
social policies “come[] closest to the pro-family ideal”).
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to play in protecting working parents from the unbridled demands of the labor
market.207 By contrast, the United States offers only meager support for lowincome families, relying instead on families to cover essential needs, such as
childcare and parental leave; further, the government largely does not insulate
families from the demands of the workplace.208 As a result, families are far more
vulnerable in the United States, and there is a high degree of inequality.209
The social institutions of racism and classism also play a powerful role in
public provisioning, influencing the extent, structure, and terms of the goods and
services provided. As Suzanne Mettler has demonstrated, all families receive
state support, but this support is hidden and normalized for middle- and upperincome families, while exposed and pathologized for low-income families.210
Public provisioning thus reflects the deep-seated belief that low-income people
are to blame for their poverty,211 and programs and rhetoric especially reinforce
the notion that Black families are improperly dependent on the government.212
*****
For all the detail of this descriptive mapping, there is much more to be said
about the institutional topography of family law, and one goal of this Article is
to invite that conversation. With this initial descriptive account of family law’s
institutions, however, it is possible, as the next Part demonstrates, to engage in
institutional analysis across an array of contemporary debates in the discourse.
III. APPLYING INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS TO FAMILY LAW
With an understanding of the elements of institutional analysis described in
Part I and the descriptive account of family law’s institutions begun in Part II,
five examples preview the novel insights that institutional analysis can bring to
almost every significant debate in contemporary family law. Section III.A shows

207

See id.
See id. at 19-42.
209
See id.
210
See SUZANNE METTLER, THE SUBMERGED STATE: HOW INVISIBLE GOVERNMENT
POLICIES UNDERMINE AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 4-5, 37-43 (Benjamin I. Page, Susan Herbst,
Lawrence R. Jacobs & James Druckman eds., 2011). Kaaryn Gustafson likens a welfare
hearing to a degradation ceremony. See Kaaryn Gustafson, Degradation Ceremonies and the
Criminalization of Low-Income Women, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 297, 307-12 (2013). Family
law more generally reflects class differences. See Jacobus tenBroek, California’s Dual System
of Family Law: Its Origin, Development, and Present Status (pt. 1), 16 STAN. L. REV. 257,
261-62 (1964) (discussing distinction between “family law of the rest of the community,”
which governs private disputes and generally defers to parents, and “family law of the poor,”
with the state readily intervening in family life).
211
David A. Super, The New Moralizers: Transforming the Conservative Legal Agenda,
104 COLUM. L. REV. 2032, 2048-58 (2004).
212
See EICHNER, supra note 5, at 177-79 (describing this history and its legacy in current
debates).
208
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that a clearer understanding of the institutional landscape brings to light
underappreciated forces in family law. Section III.B demonstrates that no
amount of doctrinal refinement is complete without a clear-eyed comparison of
the institutions that could implement the doctrine. Section III.C illustrates that a
study of institutional design illuminates new insights into perennial questions
about how the family law system operates and what can be reformed.
Section III.D offers an example of institutional resistance and institutional
support, providing a template for converting scholarship into pragmatic change.
And Section III.E weaves these strands together, showing how these elements
of institutional analysis can help us rethink our understanding of a development
in family law. In sum, these examples provide a roadmap for family law scholars
eager to embrace institutionalism.
A.

Institutional Landscape: Family Law Outside the State

To appreciate the significance of a clear descriptive account of family law’s
institutions, consider the long-standing debate about family autonomy. The
traditional view, reflected in court decisions, is that families are largely insulated
from the reach of the state, making their own decisions about important matters,
including reproductive and child-rearing choices.213 Scholars regularly
challenge this account, arguing that the state is a deep and inescapable presence
in the lives of all families,214 especially low-income families of color.215
Institutional empirical mapping adds a missing but important factor to the
conversation: the central role of nonstate institutions in family law. The debate
among scholars focuses almost exclusively on state institutions, but as the map
of the institutional landscape shows, family law often looks outside the state.
Professional associations draft legal rules that legislatures adopt wholesale,
communities provide the referent for standard-based rules, religious entities
resolve family disputes, and nonprofit agencies use public funding to offer
essential provisioning, to name but a few nonstate institutions identified in
Part II.216
213
See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 535
(1925) (“The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose
excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept
instruction from public teachers only.”); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923)
(finding unconstitutional a state law prohibiting teaching non-English languages to students,
calling prohibition an “infringement of rights long freely enjoyed”).
214
For two foundational accounts, see MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
FAMILY LAW: STATE, LAW, AND FAMILY IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE 30708 (1989); and Frances E. Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 835, 836 (1985).
215
See KHIARA M. BRIDGES, THE POVERTY OF PRIVACY RIGHTS 37-64 (2017); Wendy A.
Bach, The Hyperregulatory State: Women, Race, Poverty, and Support, 25 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 317, 318-19, 366-79 (2014).
216
See supra text accompanying notes 136-42 (describing influence of ALI, ABA, ALEC,
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Thus, when scholars consider family autonomy, it is important to ask:
freedom from whom? This question is particularly relevant to scholars who
examine the role of race and class in the state regulation of families. Khiara
Bridges and Kaaryn Gustafson, for example, have shown that the state uses
services, such as prenatal programs for low-income families and income-support
programs, to scrutinize and stigmatize low-income families and especially
women of color.217 And Wendy Bach has argued that the state uses systems of
public provisioning, including health care, education, and social services, to
hyper-regulate the lives of low-income women of color, exposing them to a
heightened risk of involvement in the criminal and child welfare systems.218
These scholars offer a powerful critique of state institutions of control, but the
descriptive account of family law shows that the state also enlists nonstate
institutions in its work. When the state privatizes public provisioning, the state
deputizes nonstate institutions to regulate families.219 When the state looks to
communities to supply the content of legal standards—as with rules about
corporal punishment and child abuse, which reference the conduct of other
parents220—the state gives legal weight to community norms. And when the state
upholds private religious arbitrations, it empowers those private processes.221
Identifying this enlistment of nonstate institutions raises concerns about the
extension of state power. There are important questions to explore about how
these nonstate institutions might cooperate, for example, in the hyperregulation
of low-income women of color.
But the enlistment of nonstate institutions also opens the door to exploring
how the deputation might mute state power. Scholars can consider, for example,
how community-driven standards might be more protective of marginalized
families. The standard for child neglect asks whether a parent has “exercise[d] a
minimum degree of care in providing for the physical needs of a child.”222
Scholars could usefully develop a framework to guide this analysis, drawing on
sociological research to help courts understand what a minimum degree of care
means for a family living in deep poverty.223 This context-driven analysis would
and Uniform Law Commission); supra text accompanying notes 133-35 (describing role of
communities); supra text accompanying notes 176-77 (describing role of religious
arbitrators); supra text accompanying notes 203-04 (describing role of religious entities and
communities in social provisioning).
217
See BRIDGES, supra note 215, at 37-64; Gustafon, supra note 210, at 307-12.
218
See Bach, supra note 215, at 318-19, 366-79.
219
See infra text accompanying notes 224-28.
220
See supra text accompanying notes 133-35.
221
See supra text accompanying notes 176-77.
222
See RESTATEMENT OF CHILD. & THE L. § 2.24(b) (AM. L. INST., Tentative Draft No. 2,
2019).
223
In judging whether a parent has met this standard, courts make some reference to family
income, but the analysis is not as searching as it could be. See, e.g., In re W.C., 288 S.W.3d
787, 789 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009) (discussing multiple factors leading to finding of physical
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emphasize the constraints on families, ideally leading to a more supportive,
rather than punitive, approach to cases of child neglect.
This consideration of state power and family autonomy through an empirical
institutional lens similarly illuminates debates about privatization. A common
critique of the practice is that it infuses private values into public functions,
allowing nonstate entities to circumvent important public-law norms such as
accountability, equality, and rationality.224 Jody Freeman has a more optimistic
account, arguing that privatization can lead to the “publicization” of state norms
because the state can condition contracts on private entities complying with
predetermined criteria.225
In the family law context, however, both privatization and publicization raise
serious concerns about pluralism and individual dignity.226 Family law addresses
deeply personal issues, including reproductive choices, sexual expression, and
parenting decisions. The provision of goods and services necessarily involves
these issues, whether in nurse-visiting programs for new parents, marriage
counseling, fatherhood initiatives, or clinics that provide family planning
services. As these programs operate with government funds, the contracting
entities—nonprofit and sometimes for-profit—make myriad decisions, large and
small, that influence families and individuals.227 This use of public funds to
spread private values is a troubling empowerment of private entities. But the
reverse is also true. As scholars have shown, the state’s stance towards lowincome families of color is decidedly punitive and stigma-inducing.228 Thus, to

neglect, including raw sewage in yard, animal feces in home, no bed linens, children dirty, no
utilities, children with lice infestations and flea bites, and one child with untreated and oozing
burn, and noting connection with poverty but not excusing parental conduct); In re E.Z.C.,
2013 MT 123, ¶¶ 28-29, 370 Mont. 116, 300 P.3d 1174 (finding physical neglect when mother
used methamphetamine; children had severe tooth decay and were fed only chips, candy, and
popsicles; and home was extremely unsanitary, including bed infested with rat feces; similarly
not placing parenting in full context of mother’s means); In re C.M., 103 A.3d 1192, 1197
(N.H. 2014) (describing original neglect finding against parents based on multiple factors,
including repeated failures to supervise, dirty home, lack of food and medicine, and
inadequate clothing, and noting that parental neglect was only partly driven by lack of means).
224
Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV.
1285, 1301-08 (2003).
225
Id. at 1290, 1314-29, 1346-47 (arguing this publicization holds potential for delivery
of services to vulnerable populations); Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance,
75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 547-49 (2000) (arguing that through privatization, government can
exert some control over private parties, furthering public goals).
226
See supra text accompanying notes 218 and 225.
227
See supra text accompanying note 216.
228
See supra text accompanying notes 215, 217-18.
Another aspect of institutionalist methodology—institutional design—reveals this
approach to social provisioning for low-income families. As the Danish sociologist Gøsta
Esping-Andersen has demonstrated, structuring public-provisioning to shame and pathologize
low-income recipients of state aid is an intrinsic part of our liberal welfare state. See GØSTA
ESPING-ANDERSEN, THE THREE WORLDS OF WELFARE CAPITALISM 55-76 (1990).
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the extent the state is using nonstate institutions to further this work,
publicization is troubling as well.
The point here is not to resolve these dilemmas but rather to argue that
descriptive accounts of family law’s institutions enrich and add important
nuance to the debate about family autonomy, demonstrating the many ways the
state extends its power as well as pointing towards opportunities for muting that
power.
B.

Institutional Choice: Functional Parenthood

Institutional choice is fundamentally about who decides what, and this
question is relevant to virtually every doctrinal issue in family law. The doctrine
of functional parents provides an apt example. As families become more fluid,
many adults act like a parent to a child but do not have a biological, adoptive, or
marital tie to the child and thus are not automatically considered a legal parent.229
As courts and legislatures across the country are deciding whether and how to
grant legal recognition to these functional parents,230 family law scholars are
making significant contributions to this debate. They assess the constitutional
rights of functional and legal parents,231 evaluate legislative proposals that
would enable legal recognition,232 and compare doctrinal approaches across
legal systems.233
Bringing an analysis of institutional choice to this debate adds a critical—and
missing—element: a consideration of the different institutions that might decide
claims by functional parents. Thus far, the debate has assumed that parties

229

See NeJaime, supra note 167, at 2264.
See id. at 2331-58, 2370 app. C (summarizing laws, decisions, and debate about
functional parenthood).
231
See David D. Meyer, What Constitutional Law Can Learn from the ALI Principles of
Family Dissolution, 2001 BYU L. REV. 1075, 1089-90 (analyzing ALI’s standard for de facto
parenthood through constitutional lens and arguing in favor of more nuanced understanding
of gradations of parental categories); Douglas NeJaime, The Constitution of Parenthood, 72
STAN. L. REV. 261, 319-43 (2020) (arguing for recognition of constitutional rights for
functional parents); Gregg Strauss, What Role Remains for De Facto Parenthood?, 46 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 909, 920-30 (2019) (arguing that recognition of functional parents diminishes
constitutional rights of existing legal parents).
232
See Mary Coombs, Insiders and Outsiders: What the American Law Institute Has Done
for Gay and Lesbian Families, 8 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 87, 95-100 (2001) (describing
with approval ALI’s standard and its protection for LGBTQ families); Robin Fretwell Wilson,
Trusting Mothers: A Critique of the American Law Institute’s Treatment of De Facto Parents,
38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1103, 1110 (2010) (critiquing de facto parenthood standard adopted by
ALI because it does not account for risks posed by former live-in partners who have abused
child); Gregory A. Loken, The New “Extended Family”—“De Facto” Parenthood and
Standing Under Chapter 2, 2001 BYU L. REV. 1045, 1055-63 (critiquing ALI standard
because it does not give enough primacy to legal parents).
233
See SOCIAL PARENTHOOD IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (Clare Huntington, Courtney
Joslin & Christiane von Bary eds.) (forthcoming) (on file with author).
230
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seeking legal recognition will litigate claims in court.234 But many would-be
parents, especially low-income parents, cannot afford lawyers or do not see the
court system as an effective tool for resolving their problems.235 Indeed, in a
related context—second-parent adoptions, which is one legal path for functional
parents to protect their rights—the cost of the legal proceedings is a significant
barrier for low-income families.236 The problem is compounded because of the
concentration of nonmarital children in low-income families: the families most
in need of legal protection are the least able and likely to use the court system.237
Considering institutional choice prompts scholars to think beyond the court
system and identify a broad range of decision-making institutions. Rather than
assuming courts will adequately meet the needs of functional parents,
comparative institutionalism invites analysis of the range of possible institutions
that might serve this role, enabling scholars to assess the advantages and
disadvantages of each.238 Informal processes, for example, would not create
enforceable legal rights, but they would help functional parents gain access to
their children as a practical matter.239
Further, an analysis of institutional choice surfaces the reality that any
substantive rule governing legal recognition, no matter how well articulated, will
be filtered differently by different institutions. Courts, formal dispute-resolution
mechanisms such as court-based mediation, informal dispute-resolution
processes such as community- and faith-based processes, and state and local

234
See, e.g., Fretwell Wilson, supra note 232, at 1110-11 (focusing exclusively on judicial
treatment of claims by de facto parents); see also NeJaime, supra note 231, at 261 (focusing
specifically on revisiting judicial precedents regarding claims of de facto parents); Strauss,
supra note 231, at 912 (arguing “de facto parenthood is either redundant or unconstitutional”
based on a survey of relevant case law).
235
See Huntington, Postmarital Family Law, supra note 3, at 209-12. Access to justice is
a significant problem in family law cases. See, e.g., id. at 210; ELKINS FAM. L. TASK FORCE,
JUD. COUNCIL OF CAL., FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS APRIL 2010, at 10 (2010)
(stating over “75 percent of family law cases, in many communities, have at least one selfrepresented party”); see also CYNTHIA COOK, INST. FOR CT. MGMT., JACKSON CNTY. CIR. CT.,
SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS IN FAMILY LAW CASES IN JACKSON COUNTY, MISSOURI 15-16
(2007) (citing statistics from other states and localities reflecting high numbers of selfrepresented litigants).
236
See Press Release, New York State, Governor Cuomo Unveils 16th Proposal of 2020
State of the State: Legalizing Gestational Surrogacy (Dec. 30, 2019),
http://web.archive.org/web/20210713041452/https:/www.governor.ny.gov/news/governorcuomo-unveils-16th-proposal-2020-state-state-legalizing-gestational-surrogacy (proposing
legislation to overcome “burdensome expenses, including lawyer’s fees, court fees and fees
for the mandatory home visit from a social worker that can cost up to $5,000”).
237
See Huntington, Postmarital Family Law, supra note 3, at 209-12.
238
See supra text accompanying notes 85-88 (describing Neil Komesar’s methodology
and argument that “single institutional analysis” is problematic).
239
For example, Australia created community-based, extralegal Family Resource Centres,
which help parents resolve issues informally. See Huntington, Postmarital Family Law, supra
note 3, at 231-33.
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agencies will each apply the same rules at times in significantly different ways.
Comparative institutional analysis would highlight these differences, showing
the advantages and disadvantages of each institution for different populations.
In short, once surfaced, it is hard to imagine discussing the doctrine of
functional parents without this kind of institutional analysis, even though the
debate has proceeded thus far without it.
C.

Institutional Design: Child Support

Scholars have identified serious concerns with the current approach to child
support, showing that the rules penalize low-income fathers, who often cannot
afford even modest child support payments,240 that the system contributes to
mass incarceration,241 and that many fathers are obligated to pay child support
without a corresponding court order allowing them to see their child.242 These
critiques are important contributions to an understanding of family law, but the
assessments and prescriptions generally ignore the inner workings of the
institutions that impose and enforce child support orders.243
Adding analysis of institutional design generates new insights into these
problems. Take just one of these issues: the absence of custody orders. In many
states, the legislature empowered administrative agencies to issue child support
orders, but the legislature did not also authorize these agencies to decide child
custody, leaving this issue solely in the province of the judiciary.244 This
institutional bifurcation of child support and child custody means that
noncustodial parents, usually fathers, often pay child support without a right to
see their child.245 To secure custody or visitation, the noncustodial parent must
initiate a parallel proceeding in family court, which many do not.246 And even
in those states that consolidate child support and child custody in court
proceedings, only one state—Texas—regularly considers child custody at the
same time it imposes a child support order.247
240

See Kohn, supra note 2, at 531-33.
See Ann Cammett, Deadbeats, Deadbrokes, and Prisoners, 18 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L.
& POL’Y 127, 141-53 (2011).
242
See Huntington, Postmarital Family Law, supra note 3, at 182-84.
243
But see Tonya L. Brito, Producing Justice in Poor People’s Courts: Four Models of
State Legal Actors, 24 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 145, 172-89 (2020) (describing results of
qualitative empirical study of child support cases in family court).
244
See supra note 170 (listing examples of states with statutes allowing administrative
agencies to establish and enforce awards of child support).
245
See Huntington, Postmarital Family Law, supra note 3, at 182-84.
246
Child Support and Parenting Time Orders, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES
(Sept. 5, 2019), https://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/child-support-and-parentingtime-orders.aspx [https://perma.cc/E8XP-NNXQ] (describing institutional bifurcation and
noting that “[t]he separate process for setting the two orders can pose an obstacle to parents,
particularly unmarried parents”).
247
See id. (“Texas has been setting parenting time responsibilities (or ‘possession’ as it is
used in statute) at the same time as child support orders for nearly 30 years.”).
241
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Surfacing and addressing the institutional bifurcation of child support and
child custody—that is, the institutional design of the child support system—
highlights the shortcomings of the system and points towards useful reforms.
Helping fathers gain access to their children has been shown to increase child
support payments, encourage paternal engagement, and improve the relationship
between the parents.248 Thus, consolidating child support and child custody
would encourage a virtuous cycle: when fathers are involved in their children’s
lives, they are more likely to pay child support, and when they pay child support,
they are more likely to stay involved.249
As this example demonstrates, examining institutional design is often an
essential piece of so many family law puzzles, and better understanding design
deepens an understanding of the problem and suggests potential solutions.
D.

Institutional Friction: Juvenile Detention and Universal Pre-K

The fourth question in this Article’s framing of institutional analysis examines
institutional friction—identifying the institutions that will impede or advance
law reform. This is an essential part of any law reform proposal because
developing a policy proposal is only part of the work. A description of two
reform efforts illustrates the importance of anticipating which institutions are
likely to resist the reform and which institutions will support it.
Beginning with resistance, despite widespread support for closing juvenile
detention facilities in New York State, doing so proved surprisingly difficult.250
All the pieces were in place for a shift in policy. Advocates convinced
policymakers to embrace community-based treatment,251 drawing on research
establishing that detention does not improve public safety and harms
adolescents.252 A gubernatorial task force in New York recommended closing
many detention facilities in the state.253 Mayor Michael Bloomberg refused to
248

See James McHale, Maureen R. Waller & Jessica Pearson, Coparenting Interventions
for Fragile Families: What Do We Know and Where Do We Need to Go Next?, 51 FAM.
PROCESS 284, 289-90 (2012) (reviewing states’ efforts under Access and Visitation Program);
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., CHILD ACCESS AND VISITATION PROGRAMS:
PARTICIPANT OUTCOMES PROGRAM ANALYSIS 49-68 (2006) (assessing outcomes of state
access and visitation programs).
249
See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., OFF. OF CHILD SUPPORT ENF’T, CHILD
SUPPORT FACT SHEET SER. NO. 3, ENGAGEMENT OF FATHERS FROM BIRTH 1 [hereinafter CHILD
SUPPORT
FACT
SHEET],
https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ocse
/engagement_of_fathers.pdf [https://perma.cc/V7FH-3EMK] (last visited Feb. 4, 2022).
250
See infra text accompanying notes 251-55.
251
CHILD SUPPORT FACT SHEET, supra note 249, at 2.
252
Clare Huntington & Elizabeth S. Scott, Conceptualizing Legal Childhood in the
Twenty-First Century, 118 MICH. L. REV. 1371, 1387-90, 1399 (2020) (describing this
consensus and underlying research; further noting expense of detention was a factor).
253
See generally GOVERNOR DAVID PATERSON’S TASK FORCE ON TRANSFORMING JUV.
JUST., CHARTING A NEW COURSE: A BLUEPRINT FOR TRANSFORMING JUVENILE JUSTICE IN NEW
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send adolescents to the facilities, and a state commissioner decided the facilities
should be shut.254 The closures dragged on for years, however, because of strong
resistance from the labor union representing the workers in the upstate detention
facilities.255 If scholars had focused more on institutional friction, they might
have anticipated this institutional point of resistance and developed an
affirmative strategy to address it.
Institutional analysis also helps explain the success of some law reform
efforts, as illustrated by the universal prekindergarten movement.256 Every level
of government, including states across the political spectrum, have embraced
prekindergarten as an effective means for combating poverty and preparing
children for school.257 An institutional account demonstrates that a broad range
of institutions played a role in promoting this beneficial reform. Academic
research established the profound and long-lasting benefits of preschool, which
are measurable into adulthood; it also showed these investments are costeffective.258 Foundations provided funding for pilot programs, advocacy,
research, and communications, and gathered support from other institutions,
including law enforcement and teachers’ unions.259 Think tanks prepared reports
documenting that full-day preschool led to more mothers participating in the
workforce.260 And economic institutions, including business leaders and others

YORK STATE (2009) (recommending reduced use of institutional placement, downsizing and
closing underutilized facilities, and reinvesting in communities).
254
Bloomberg Pushes for Control of Juvenile Justice System, GOTHAM GAZETTE
https://www.gothamgazette.com/index.php/archives/752-bloomberg-pushes-for-control-ofjuvenile-justice-system [https://perma.cc/6K3F-MK39] (last visited Feb. 4, 2022); David W.
Chen, New York City Sues State over the Cost of Housing Juveniles in Prisons, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 10, 2010, at A30; New ACS Commissioner Gladys Carrión, N.Y. PUB. RADIO (Feb. 12,
2014), https://www.wnyc.org/story/new-acs-commissioner-gladys-carrion [https://perma.cc
/8ZYG-ZGBR].
255
See Cindy Rodriguez, Report Finds Problems Plague State-Run Juvenile Detention
Centers, N.Y. PUB. RADIO (Dec. 14, 2009), https://www.wnyc.org/story/72715-report-findsproblems-plague-state-run-juvenile-detention-centers/ [https://perma.cc/H8WP-YAYZ].
256
I have detailed this story elsewhere. See generally Clare Huntington, Early Childhood
Development and the Replication of Poverty, in HOLES IN THE SAFETY NET: FEDERALISM AND
POVERTY 130 (Ezra Rosser ed., 2019) (describing differences in early child development care
across states).
257
For a summary of these investments, including the political diversity, see id. at 146-50.
258
See DAVID L. KIRP, THE SANDBOX INVESTMENT: THE PRESCHOOL MOVEMENT AND
KIDS-FIRST POLITICS 50-135 (2007) (summarizing this research from multiple fields,
including education, economics, and neuroscience).
259
Id. at 153-78 (describing work of Pew Charitable Trusts and Packard Foundation: Pew
began with several states—both conservative and liberal—and identified receptive
policymakers and advocacy groups willing to collaborate and also actively courted support
from business community, while Packard concentrated efforts on prekindergarten in
California and used many of the same strategies).
260
Rasheed Malik, The Effects of Universal Preschool in Washington, D.C.: Children’s
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in the private sector, supported the investments, convinced of the workforce
benefits.261
As these two examples demonstrate, studying institutional friction helps
explain why some reforms flounder and seemingly uphill battles can succeed.
Institutionalism prompts a comprehensive analysis by scholars, advocates, and
policymakers of the relevant institutional stakeholders, veto points, political
economy, and other aspects of the mechanisms of change. Understanding this
institutional friction is essential to any proposal for law reform and provides a
potential blueprint for other reform efforts—demonstrating the value of
foregrounding institutional friction in any analysis.262
E.

A Synthesis: Covenant Marriage

To round out this Part’s illustration of the value of the institutional turn in
family law, it is important to note that scholars need not engage the core
questions of institutional analysis discretely. Instead, scholars can synthesize the
elements of institutional analysis, as illustrated by a brief examination of
covenant marriage. Louisiana was the first state to pioneer covenant marriage—
which allows couples to opt into a more binding form of marriage263—and
Arkansas264 and Arizona265 soon followed. To enter a covenant marriage, a
couple must engage in premarital counseling and agree to limited grounds for
divorce, the least onerous of which is a two-year separation.266 The couple also
affirms their belief that marriage is a lifelong commitment.267
Most family law scholars dismiss covenant marriage as a failed attempt to
revive traditionalism and undo no-fault divorce.268 Very few couples have
entered into covenant marriages, and no additional states have adopted the
law.269 The issue thus has not been a source of much scholarly engagement. But
Learning and Mothers’ Earnings, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Sept. 26, 2018),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/early-childhood/reports/2018/09/26/458208
/effects-universal-preschool-washington-d-c/ [https://perma.cc/98D2-DSCK].
261
KIRP, supra note 258, at 76.
262
See supra Section III.D.
263
LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:272 to -275.1 (2021).
264
ARK. CODE. ANN. §§ 9-11-801 to -811 (2021).
265
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-901 to -906 (2021).
266
See, e.g., LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:272 to -273.
267
See, e.g., id. § 9:272.
268
See JUDITH AREEN, MARC SPINDELMAN, PHILOMILA TSOUKALA & SOLANGEL
MALDONADO, FAMILY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 850 (Saul Levmore et al. eds., 7th ed.
2019); D. KELLY WEISBERG & SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 524 (6th ed. 2016).
269
See Peter Feuerherd, Why Covenant Marriage Failed to Take Off, JSTOR DAILY (Feb.
11, 2019), https://daily.jstor.org/why-covenant-marriage-failed-to-take-off/ [https://perma.cc
/9BTA-CLLM] (“In practice, however, couples in [Louisiana, Arkansas, and Arizona] largely
ignored the option. Covenant marriage never comprised more than five percent of all
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institutional analysis of covenant marriage shows that it can be a rich site for
generating lessons about marriage and family law more generally.
Descriptively mapping the institutions of covenant marriage shows that
reformers purposefully engaged multiple institutions. Supporters of covenant
marriage turned to legislatures to enact the law and courts to enforce the
provisions, but they also made an explicit effort to bring other institutions,
especially the church, into the public square.270 By requiring premarital
counseling and specifying that it could be done by religious entities,271 reformers
codified the belief that religion has a central role to play in marriage.
This empirical institutional foundation lays the groundwork for analyzing
institutional choice. Reformers chose one route—secular marriage laws—to
revive a traditional understanding of marriage, but a consideration of
institutional choice shows that other options might have been more effective,
depending on the goal. If the intention was to further a religious belief in lifelong
marriage, then religious entities could have contemplated alternative, religionand community-based means for helping couples stay together. If the goal was
to create a stickier marriage contract with legal roadblocks to divorce, then
reformers needed to think through the problem that one person in the marriage
could easily circumvent the divorce restrictions by establishing residency in
another state and using that state’s more liberal divorce laws.272 And if the
objective was symbolic action, then arguably, the chosen means were
successful—covenant marriage is on the books, highlighting the easy nature of
no-fault divorce. Depending on the aim, then, comparative institutionalism
might show that there was a mismatch between the religious goal of encouraging
lifelong commitment and the chosen means of engaging the legal system outside
the religious setting. Or it might show that the effort was surprisingly successful.
An analysis of institutional design demonstrates that covenant marriage was,
at its core, an effort to shore up the institution of marriage. Advocates of
marriages.”); Sheri Stritof, Pros and Cons of a Covenant Marriage: A New Trend in Marriage
Reform or a Trap for Women?, SPRUCE (Jan. 5, 2020), http://web.archive.org/web
/20210318045200/https:/www.thespruce.com/covenant-marriage-pros-and-cons-2300528
(reporting that only 1% of marriages in Louisiana between 2000 and 2014 were covenant
marriages and “only one-fourth of one percent of couples getting married in Arizona select
the covenant marriage option”).
270
Katherine Shaw Spaht, Louisiana’s Covenant Marriage: Social Analysis and Legal
Implications, 59 LA. L. REV. 63, 75 (1998) (“Another less obvious objective of the legislation,
which is reflected in who may perform the mandatory pre-marital counseling, is to revitalize
and reinvigorate the ‘community’ known as the church. Reinvigoration results from inviting
religion back ‘into the public square . . . .’”).
271
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-901 (2021); ARK. CODE. ANN. § 9-11-804 (2021); LA.
STAT. ANN. §§ 9:272 to -273.
272
As any student of family law knows, if one person in the couple establishes residency
in a state, the state court has jurisdiction and will apply that state’s divorce laws. See, e.g.,
ALA. CODE § 30-2-5 (2021); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-10 (West 2021). Thus, a person with a
covenant marriage in Louisiana can move to another state and circumvent the restrictions on
divorce. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 10(A)(7) (2021).
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covenant marriage were resisting social changes to the institution and trying to
return to a traditional conception of it.273 Institutional design highlights this
effort, but it also helps scholars understand the institution of marriage as it is and
might be. Protecting spouses from the risks of divorce is not inherently
traditionalist. A long-standing feminist criticism of no-fault divorce is that it
disadvantages the partner who invests in the family rather than a career.274
Covenant marriage was intended to reinforce traditional gender norms, but it
could have been done with sensitivity to pluralism, power dynamics within
couples, and sticky norms about caregiving and breadwinning. This, of course,
is exceptionally difficult, but a focus on institutional design encourages the
conversation.
Finally, analysis of institutional friction invites a debate about the challenges
of changing a mixed social and legal institution through legislation. The
sociological literature on institutions describes the difficulty of reforming
entrenched institutions.275 On the one hand, the limited uptake of covenant
marriage276 suggests a mismatch between an anticipated demand for covenant
marriage and the actual demand. Alternatively, perhaps the effort was always
intended to be symbolic and was not a serious attempt to change the contours of
the institution of marriage. Either way, studying institutional friction is a fertile
path of inquiry, revealing a new understanding of the intentions of the reformers
and the potential for future reform.
As this example demonstrates, institutional analysis brings together the core
questions in the methodology, training a new lens on familiar conversations and
generating new insights, research agendas, and possibilities for reform.
CONCLUSION
Institutionalism is deeply and fruitfully entrenched as a methodology across
the legal academy, but far too many family law scholars—including myself,
until this Article—have failed to embrace its value, to the detriment of family
law. Identifying the breadth of institutions that shape family law opens new
avenues for debate and research. Analyzing institutional choice surfaces
important questions about which institutions are better positioned to decide
substantive rules, resolve disputes, and distribute resources. Exploring questions
of institutional design deepens understanding of relevant institutions and opens
the door for framing institutional improvements. And examining institutional
273
As historians documented in the marriage equality debate, the institution of marriage is
evolving, not fixed, with many changes over the last few centuries. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576
U.S. 644, 659-60 (2015) (citing NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND
THE NATION 9-17 (2000)).
274
See, e.g., FINEMAN, supra note 8, at 25-28, 161-64.
275
See ALBISTON, supra note 19, at 27-28; Albiston, Institutional Perspectives, supra note
104, at 408-12.
276
See supra note 269 and accompanying text (describing limited use of covenant
marriages).
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frictions reveals the many institutional levers that can be pulled to achieve or
resist change, illuminating pathways for law reform.
Institutionalism need not be an integral part of every scholarly project in
family law, of course, and the degree of institutional engagement will vary.277
Sometimes, an agenda-setting piece will simply mention institutional issues.278
Often, however, it will be important for scholars to go deeper by identifying
relevant institutions and foregrounding institutional analysis. At the very least,
institutional concerns should be considered in most family law scholarly
projects. In this way, institutionalism is analogous to empirical legal studies,
which is so thoroughly integrated into legal scholarship that it is an integral part
of the dialogue. Even if an article is not empirical, the scholar knows to at least
allude to this tool, asking if there is empirical evidence on a given question.279
Institutionalism should be the same, with family law scholars asking whether
institutionalism would add a missing layer of the analysis. Whatever the degree
of engagement, by foregrounding institutions and engaging in intentional,
rigorous, holistic institutional analysis, family law scholars will add important
new perspectives to legal debates and law reform.

277
See, e.g., Fineman, supra note 98, at 1-15, 12 n.31 (arguing for reassessment of
institutions that manage these inherent vulnerabilities, including analysis of how “assetconferring institutions,” such as those governing health, education, and employment, ensure
that all individuals are receiving societal goods necessary for well-being; further contending
policy analysis must look at institutions because they “are simultaneously constituted by and
producers of vulnerability”).
278
Relatedly, scholars can calibrate both the level of specificity and the breadth of the
relevant institutions for different projects and different aspects of institutional analysis.
279
See Huntington, Empirical Turn, supra note 8, at 235-66 (describing this but also noting
downsides of empiricism in family law).

